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I. INTRODUCTION
With the D.C. Circuit's recent ruling in Comcast v. FCC,' the court has
thrown the Federal Communications Commission's efforts to promote an
"Open Internet" into legal limbo.2 At the time of this writing, Federal Commu-
nications Commission ("FCC") Chairman Julius Genachowski responded by
announcing that he would seek to impose a "Third Way" of regulation for
broadband. Under the "Third Way" approach, the Commission would reclas-
sify broadband transport as a "telecommunications service" under Title II of
the Communications Act, coupled however with aggressive use of the FCC's
forbearance authority under Section 10 of the Communications Act to elimi-
nate many of the more burdensome requirements of Title II regulation.' In so
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are the authors' alone and do not represent the views of the Phoenix Center, its Adjunct
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Associate Professor of Economics, Auburn University.
I Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
2 In re Preserving the Open Internet, NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING, 24 F.C.C.R.
13,064, % 2, 10 (Oct. 22, 2009) (hereinafter Open Internet NPRM).
3 Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, The Third Way: A Narrowly
Tailored Broadband Framework, Statement of Chairman Julius Genachowski 4-5, available
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/DOC-297944Al.pdf (May 6, 2010)
[hereinafter Genachowski Statement].
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doing, the Commission would ostensibly create some sort of "Title II Lite"4
regulation for broadband Internet services.
An outline for this new regulatory approach to broadband Internet service is
provided in statements made by Chairman Genachowski and FCC General
Counsel Austin Schlick ("Statements ").' In the Statements, the question of the
regulatory classification of broadband services is pitched as a Morton's Fork.'
On the one hand, the FCC could retain the Title I classification, but doing so
"has a serious risk of failure in court," if the agency attempts to aggressively
regulate broadband Internet services.' On the other hand, the FCC could re-
classify broadband as a Title II service, but this approach also "has serious
drawbacks."' Reclassification, the Chairman argues, does "clarify the legal
foundation for broadband policy," but reclassification likewise "would also
subject the providers of broadband communications services to extensive regu-
lations ill-suited to broadband."' In an effort to resolve this dilemma, the
Chairman proposes a "Third Way," where reclassification occurs but the agen-
cy "[p]ut[s] in place up-front forbearance and meaningful boundaries to guard
against regulatory overreach.""o The result, allegedly, is a "lite" formulation of
Title II regulation, which both Chairman Genachowski and Mr. Schlick sug-
gest has been applied successfully to wireless communications for over a dec-
ade."
It is important to keep in mind, as the Statements do, that regulatory classifi-
cation is not a goal of the regulation but is merely alleged to be a necessary
component of the regulatory process. All services subject to regulation must be
put into one box or another. 2 As for goals, Chairman Genachowski claims the
4 John Eggerton, FCC to Adopt "Title II Lite" Approach to Web Regulation, BROAD-
CASTING & CABLE (May 5, 2010, 4:41 PM),
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/452298-
FCC toAdopt Title II Lite Approach to Web Regulation.php.
5 See Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 4-5; Press Release, Federal Communi-
cations Commission, A Third-Way Legal Framework for Addressing the Comcast Dilemma,
Statement of General Counsel Austin Schlick, available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-297945Al.pdf (May 6, 2010) [he-
reinafter Schlick Statement].
6 A Morton's Fork is a choice between two equally unattractive alternatives.
7 Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 4.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 5.
10 Id
II Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 6; Schlick Statement, supra note 5, at 5.
12 The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, provides the FCC with express "au-
thority to regulate common carrier services, including landline telephony;" "radio transmis-
sions, including broadcast television, radio and cellular telephony;" and "'cable services,'
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most basic goal of broadband policy is to "encourage private investment and
the building of a communications infrastructure."" Likewise, in the National
Broadband Plan, the Commission drafted a "plan [describing] actions gov-
ernment should take to encourage more private innovation and investment." 4
However, classification, as observed by the Chairman, may have a signifi-
cant effect on private investment. In his Statement, the Chairman states the
dozens of new "[h]eavy-handed prescriptive regulation[s]"" contained in Title
II "can chill investment and innovation" by reducing investors' confidence."
As such, the agency must proceed with caution, as the influence of classifica-
tion on private investment is a central policy issue.
The Commission's judicial and regulatory dilemma can be summarized by
the following question-what is the best regulatory scheme to encourage in-
vestment yet provide sufficient authority for only the appropriate regulatory
action? By Chairman Genachowski's own logic, Title I ancillary authority is
more conducive to investment than Title II classification, since Title I has an
exogenously enforced "light touch". Therefore, the Statements must and do
argue that the "Third Way" is an effort to make its regulatory choices under
Title II much like those under Title I to save investment incentives, but reclas-
sification permits a more solid legal foundation." That is, reclassification only
affects the ease with which the Commission can lightly regulate. Unfortu-
nately, reclassification also affects the ease with which the Commission can
heavily regulate if it chooses to do so. Under the existing ancillary approach to
regulation, the burden is on the agency to make a compelling and legally sound
case for regulatory intervention in the broadband marketplace. The upshot of
this approach is an embedded judicial discipline on intervention, thereby sig-
including cable television." Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 645. See also James B. Speta, The
Shaky Foundations of the Regulated Internet, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 106
(2010).
13 Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 1. Notwithstanding the Chairman's com-
ment, we stress that increasing investment and jobs are not legitimate policy goals. Public
policy should aim to increase social surplus (consumer plus producer surplus) in an eco-
nomically efficient manner. For example, say there are two technologies that can generate
the same social surplus, but one requires more labor and capital than the other. Obviously,
the economically-sound decision is to the use the technology that requires fewer inputs of
production, even though it means lower capital expenditures and fewer jobs.
14 FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN
5 (2010) available at http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf [he-
reinafter NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN].
15 Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 2.
16 Id. at 2.
17 See Schlick, supra note 5, at 4-5; Genachowski, supra note 3, at 5.
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naling to investors there is a "light touch" regulatory approach to broadband
services, and this relaxed regulation is enforced exogenously (i.e., by the
courts). The "Third Way" or reclassification approach, in contrast, opens the
door to heavy-handed regulation, thereby requiring the Commission to exercise
substantial self-imposed discipline to limit regulatory intrusion. If not, invest-
ment is "chilled." From a legal standpoint, therefore, the Commission can ei-
ther (a) rely on the courts to impose discipline on its regulation of broadband;
or (b) rely on its own self-control, now and in the future, to enforce regulatory
restraint in a world where it will have both the authority, and the political mo-
tivation, to intervene. As shown below, the second approach lacks credibility
with the capital markets. Consequently, the Title I approach leads to more pri-
vate investment.
Without debate, reclassification greases the wheels of the regulatory ma-
chine for both light-and heavy-handed regulations. As such, the argument over
reclassification is thus reduced to one of credibility-can the Commission be
trusted to self-impose regulatory moderation, thereby maintaining efficient
investment incentives?" In light of its past and current actions, as will be dis-
cussed below, the answer is almost surely "no." Even if the Commission today
has such discipline, and we demonstrate it does not, the adverse effect on capi-
tal markets and industry investment remains intact because it is the beliefs of
the participants in the financial markets that matter in this regard, not those of
the Commission. As we show below (in Section III.B. 2), evidence from the
financial markets indicates that the agency lacks credibility for light touch reg-
ulation and, consequently, a contraction in investment is expected in response
to reclassification (ceteris paribus).
To explore this important topic, this article is organized as follows. First, we
analyze the reclassification issue in terms of a "broadband credibility gap." We
provide a simple game theoretic analysis that exposes the underlying issue sur-
rounding regulatory classification and credibility. In so doing, we demonstrate
that a "light touch" toward regulating broadband is not credible (it is not a sub-
game equilibrium). Moreover, we use the current Commission's own actions
to demonstrate it lacks the necessary self-discipline or mindset for light touch
18 As explained in more detail in Section II.A below, "credibility" does not mean, and
should not be identified with, "honesty." Rather, when we argue that the Commission's
claim that it will forbear from heavy-handed exercise of its regulatory authority, we mean
only that this claim will not be found convincing ex ante by either the firms being regulated,
nor, more importantly, the capital markets on which these firms must usually rely for financ-
ing of their investment projects. This is so because the promise will not be in the interest of
the Commission to actually carry out, should circumstances unfold in a particular manner.
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regulation. Second, we consider the investment effects of reclassification using
a theoretical model of investment. In this model, a firm faces either "weak" or
"strong" regulation. This model shows that an increase in the ex ante probabil-
ity of "strong" regulation-that is, reclassification-weakens investment in-
centives. This result is largely non-controversial and is consistent with the
claim of Chairman Genachowski that heavy-handed regulation chills invest-
ment, and the response of the financial markets further indicates a decline in
investment incentives from reclassification. Whether or not reclassification
results in heavy-handed regulation has yet to be determined, but the regulatory
change certainly increases the probability of heavy-handed regulation. As such,
the causal connection between reclassification and reduced investment is in
force, irrespective of actual agency action. Third, we provide evidence from
the financial markets supporting the negative investment effects implied by the
theory. This same evidence also reveals that investors have no confidence that
the Commission possesses the self-discipline required to successfully imple-
ment "light touch" regulation. Next, we argue that the Comcast decision is not
a threat to ancillary authority for broadband, and that if the Commission keeps
its focus on preventing demonstrated cases of harm (as opposed to repeating its
efforts to impose broader price regulation on broadband service providers),
Title I continues to provide a sound legal footing to protect consumers from
harm-at least until Congress decides to update and amend existing Commu-
nications law. Further, Title I classification contains an exogenously enforced
barrier to more aggressive regulation-that is, the courts. By Chairman Gena-
chowski's own argument, such exogenous barriers to "overreaching" are desir-
able for the maintenance and expansion of private investment. Concluding
comments close the report.
II. THE "BROADBAND CREDIBILITY GAP"
The Statements by FCC officials purport to describe a "Third Way" for
regulating broadband Internet services. This "Third Way" is supposed to be
necessary given dissatisfaction with the two other ways that the agency could
proceed. As detailed in the Statements, the "first option" is to "continu[e] to
pursue policies with respect to broadband Internet access under the ancillary
authority approach." 9 Given the Comcast decision, the Chairman opines that
this option "has a serious risk of failure in court,"20 though, as argued below,
1 Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 4.
20 Id.
2010]1 79
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
his interpretation of Comcast is debatable. Much of the Commission's regula-
tion occurs under ancillary authority,21 and the courts have repeatedly affirmed
the presence and enforceability of the Commission's ancillary authority.22 In
fact, the courts have been fairly deferential on ancillary authority when the
Commission makes sound arguments.23
The second option is "reclassifying broadband services as 'telecommunica-
tions services' and applying the full suite of Title 1I obligations."24 According
to the Chairman, this approach is likewise problematic, in that it imposes "ex-
tensive regulations ill-suited to broadband," it "fail[s] to reflect the long-
standing bipartisan consensus that the Internet should remain unregulated,"25
and it can "chill investment and innovation."26
The alleged shortcomings of these two options-a "serious risk of failure in
court" with respect to Title I and "extensive regulation [that will] chill invest-
ment" with respect to Title IL-leads the Chairman to propose the "Third
Way."27 In this approach, broadband is first reclassified as a telecommunica-
tions service, thereby providing the Commission the authority to apply "the
full suite of Title II obligations"28 including "[h]eavy-handed prescriptive regu-
lation."29 On its own initiative, however, the Commission would then promise
to "[a]pply only a handful" of such regulations, putting "in place up-front for-
bearance and meaningful boundaries to guard against regulatory overreach.""
This "but for" approach to reclassification acquires a "sound[] legal founda-
21 For nearly 70 years, the Supreme Court has recognized the FCC's ancillary authority.
Since then, the FCC has relied on this authority to regulate "communications matters not
directly addressed elsewhere in [the FCCC's statutory authority]." This authority has been
used to regulate broadcast television, cable television, and Internet service. See generally
Brief for Respondents at 41-45 Comcast Corp. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 600 F.3d 642
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1291), 2009 WL 3557928 [hereinafter "FCC Brief'].
22 See, e.g., FCC Brief, supra note 21, at 34-35. See infra Part IV.A (discussing reasons
why the FCC lost in Comcast). For nearly 70 years, the Supreme Court has recognized the
FCC's ancillary authority. Since then, the FCC has relied on this authority to regulate
"communications matters not directly addressed elsewhere in [the FCC's statutory author-
ity]." Id. This authority has been used to regulate broadcast television, cable television, and
Internet service.
23 See FCC v. Nat. Citizens Comm. For Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 796 (holding that regula-
tions were valid because they were within reasonable means to achieving a public interest
goal).
24 Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 4.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 4-5.
28 Id.
29 Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 2.
30 Id. at 5.
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tion"3 in return for exposing broadband Internet services to "dozens of new
regulatory requirements"3 2 of the "extensive"" and "heavy handed prescrip-
tive" sort.34 "But for" a promise of self-imposed regulatory discipline now and
in the future by a regulatory institution-the Federal Communications Com-
mission-a reduction to investment would follow." Indeed, the Chairman rec-
ognizes that if these boundaries "unravel," then investor confidence will
wane." In other words, if the Commission fails to exercise self discipline, the
chilling effect of reclassification is, by the Chairman's own logic, in full effect.
Both Chairman Genachowski and Mr. Schlick repeatedly point to the re-
quirement of "meaningful boundaries" and "up-front forbearance" so that the
"renunciation of regulatory overreach will not unravel," yet it is clear to both
that this Third Way cannot, in their own words, "prevent the Commission from
adjusting its future policies in light of changed circumstances."37 Commis-
sioner Clyburn agrees, stating that "there is no such thing as certainty" in the
regulatory context.38 Therefore, the Commission cannot really pre-commit to
"light touch" regulation after its proposed reclassification. As revealed by
game theory, this lack of pre-commitment presents serious problems for the
Third Way. We describe such problems briefly and then explore the various
arguments to support the Third Way in more detail below.
A. Pre-Commitment and Credibility: A Game Theoretic Analysis
In this paper, we view reclassification in terms of a "broadband credibility
gap." The idea of credibility has a very specific meaning in game theory. Al-
though in some respects this is a common sense notion, the game-theoretic
treatment has a fundamental advantage over the ordinary application of this
term. Specifically, "credibility" does not mean, and should not be identified
with "honesty." Rather, when we argue that the Commission is not credible
31 Id. at 5. The Chairman argues that Title II reclassification would chill investment "but
for" the heavy use of forbearance.
32 Id. at 4.
33 Id
34 Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 2.
35 Id
36 Id. at 5.
37 Id. at 5; Schlick Statement, supra note 5, at 4, 8-9.
3s Mignon L. Clyburn, Commn'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Prepared Remarks before
the Media Institute, (June 3, 2010) (available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocsjpublic/attachmatch/DOC-298599A1.pdf) (hereinafter Cly-
burn June 3, 2010 Speech).
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when it claims that it will forbear from heavy-handed exercise of its regulatory
authority, we mean only that this claim will not be found convincing ex ante by
neither the firms being regulated nor, more importantly, the capital markets
upon which these firms must usually rely for financing of their investment pro-
jects. This is so because the promise will not be in the interest of the Commis-
sion to actually carry out, should circumstances unfold in a particular manner.
The Commission's actions need not necessarily be motivated by a bad intent,
but can conservatively be assumed to maximize surplus in future periods after
the investment is sunk. Thus, the problem need not be one of the Commission
acting in a manner contrary to the public welfare in the future (though we can-
not exclude the possibility it will), but the agency's future decisions are made
after investments are made (i.e. sunk). A very simple extensive form game
from most game theory textbooks illustrates this important, yet subtle, point.39
Suppose two players, A and R, will play the following simple game illus-
trated in Figure 1. First, player A will make a choice between two irreversible
options, which we designate I (invest) or 0 (do not invest). For simplicity of
presentation, suppose this decision is observed by R (the regulator). Player R
then makes a choice between actions H (strong or heavy regulation, say) or L
(light regulation). Having made this choice, the game ends and the players A
and R receive the payoffs given below, depending on the sequence of choices
made by the participants (with A's payoff given first).
Figure 1. The Extensive Form Game
0 (3,3)
A H (0,10)
R
L (4,5)
Several points about this simple example deserve comment. First, A must
make her investment decision by forming an expectation regarding the prob-
39 See, e.g., KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (Oxford Un-
iv. Press 2007).
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able response of R. Because we assume A and R are interested in maximizing
their own payoffs, A would only be willing to make the choice I (make the
sunk investment) if A expected R to respond by implementing the choice L
(light regulation). This is so because A can assure herself of a profit of 3 by
selecting the choice 0. Clearly, though, R's probable response to the choice I is
not a mystery here: R will maximize his payoffs by selecting H (heavy regula-
tion) and obtaining the payoff 10 instead of 5. Thus, A rationally expects the
choice I to be followed by the choice H by player R. Consequently, A's in-
vestment decision problem is solved: A will do best by selecting 0 at the be-
ginning, and obtaining the payoff of 3.
We call attention to two more features of this simple example. First, if play-
er R could credibly promise to select the choice L in the event that A chose I,
then A would willingly do so, and the payoffs (4, 5) would be obtained, and
both A and R would be better off than they are when A chooses 0. In particu-
lar, R would surely wish to be able to convince A that such would be the case.
Unfortunately, given the payoffs written here, that is a difficult task because A
will realize that R has no actual incentive to select L should the opportunity
actually arise.
Second, if one regards the sums of the players' payoffs as representative of
society's levels of aggregate welfare or benefit for the different combinations
of actions, then we see that the outcomes can be ranked, from most to least
socially desirable, in the order (I, H), (I, L), and finally (0, any choice). This
rank has several implications. R's choice of H in response to A's selection of I
is, in fact, socially desirable, and R cannot be criticized for selecting H from
the social point-of-view. However, the actual outcome ("equilibrium") of this
game has A selecting 0, which makes both the firm and the regulator (A and R)
worse off than the choices (1, L). Thus, the inability of Player R to credibly
promise to respond with action L is costly to everyone. Chairman Gena-
chowski, Austin Schlick, and Commissioner Clyburn have all agreed that no
such commitment is possible,40 thereby leading to the broadband credibility
gap. Commissioner Copps has expressed outright his distaste for "light touch"
Title II regulation.4
40 Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 5; see Schlick Statement, supra note 5, at 8
(stating that "[A]lthough neither approach would, could, or should absolutely prevent the
Commission from adjusting its future policies in light of changed circumstances, "). See
Clyburn June 3, 2010 Speech, supra note 38, at 3 (stating that "there is no such thing as
certainty" in the regulatory context).
41 See Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Statement of Commissioner Michael J.
Copps on Chairman Genachowski's Announcement to Reclassify Broadband (May 6, 2010),
(Footnote Continued ... .)
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How, then, might the inefficiency illustrated by this game be avoided? There
appear to be two immediate solutions. First, if R could compel A to select I,
the payoffs (0,10) could be obtained, and these are socially best. If, however,
no such mechanism exists, one could consider the alternative approach in
which B somehow eliminates its choice H. This option has a large advantage
over the first, as it is sometimes possible for players to credibly limit their own
options by making a binding agreement with a third party, while it is often in-
feasible for one player to effectively command the actions of another. This is
the essential defect in the Third Way-the Statements attempt an argument for
commitment (e.g., "meaningful boundaries to guard against regulatory over-
reach")42 but, in the end, recognize such a commitment is impossible (i.e.,
"prevent the Commission from adjusting its future policies in light of changed
circumstances").43 The Third Way lacks credibility and, consequently, the
negative effects of heavy-handed regulation are expected to ensue.
To summarize, this example illustrates a basic problem with regulation
when the regulator is unable to credibly convince private investors of its future
regulatory behavior. Firms and investors make decisions based on their profit-
ability, and this profitability depends on how they will be regulated going for-
ward.44 Society may well benefit, in aggregate, if these investments are made.
Yet the prospect of heavy regulation reduces profits and can dissuade investors
from the outset. This result does not depend on erratic behavior by the regula-
tor: on the contrary, the regulator may well act with the welfare of society
foremost in its mind. Unless the regulator is able to take steps to assure inves-
tors it will behave favorably, though, society may suffer. Such assurances from
regulators, by their own admission, are ephemeral in nature. A benefit of Title
I classification is that the "light touch" is enforced exogenously by the courts,
forcing the Commission to present compelling and well-crafted arguments for
regulatory intervention.
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-297946A.pdf) [here-
inafter Copps Statement]("Frankly, I would have preferred plain and simple Title II reclassi-
fication").
42 Genachowski statement, supra note 3, at 5.
43 Schlick Statement, supra note 5, at 8.
44 See, e.g., THOMAS W. HAZLETr, AEI-BROOKING JOINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUD-
IES CONVERGENCE BROADBAND COMMUNICATIONS, REGULATION AND VERTICAL INTEGRA-
TION BROADBAND ACCESS AND SUPPLY 5, 11 (Feb. 15, 2002) (noting that telephone compa-
nies are more heavily regulated than cable television companies and, as a result, cable com-
panies have been more aggressive in the high-speed Internet marketplace); see also id. at 12
(stating that the threat of regulation "for cable operators has negatively impacted investment
incentives").
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B. Credibility in Light of Action
Chairman Genachowski essentially sets forth five arguments as to why the
Commission can be trusted not to capitulate to temptation and aggressively
apply its new and improved regulatory authority. They are, in no particular
order, that: (1) the FCC will not seek to impose price regulation; (2) "Title II
Lite" is just like the paradigm set forth by Congress in Section 332 for com-
mercial mobile radio services ("CMRS") or wireless services; (3) forbearance
will be a relatively easy and innocuous process; (4) the Commission is unlikely
to reverse any forbearance decision; and (5) local loop unbundling is not on the
table. We evaluate each in turn, and find that the Commission's actions under
Chairman Genachowski belie each and every argument.45
1. This Commission has Already Tried to Impose Price Regulation
Mr. Genachowski argues that the "Title II Lite" paradigm would "not
change established policy undertakings at the FCC . . . such as the practice of
broadband prices or pricing structures."46 Unfortunately, this statement appears
to be inconsistent with the Commission's actions under his tenure as Chair-
man.
First, the Commission's initial proposal to regulate the Internet-last au-
tumn's "Open Internet" Notice of Proposed Rulemaking-is unambiguously
price regulation ofInternet carriers.47 Under the plain terms of the FCC's pro-
posal contained in this Notice, the "non-discrimination" rule mandates "that a
broadband Internet access service provider may not charge . . . for enhanced or
prioritized access . . . ."48 Any rule that mandates that a firm "may not charge"
is unquestionably price regulation. Consequently, one of Chairman Gena-
chowski's first proposals was to price regulate broadband services. Further-
more, the requirement to sell two completely different services at the exact
same price has nothing to do with preventing discrimination.49 Put simply, the
45 See discussion infra Parts II.B.1-5.
46 Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 5.
47 GEORGE S. FORD & LAWRENCE J. SPIWAK, PHOENIX CTR. FOR THE ADVANCED LEGAL
& ECON. PUB. POL'Y. STUDIES, NON-DISCRIMINATION OR JUST NON-SENSE: A LAW AND
EcoNoMICs REVIEW OF THE FCC's NEW NET NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE 5 (March 24, 2010),
available at http://www.phoenix-center.org/perspectives/Perspective10-03Final.pdf.
48 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 2, at 106.
49 See FORD & SPIWAK, supra note 47, at 4. Authors note that the FCC's attempt to craft
a new bright line non-discrimination rule is "plainly incompatible" with accepted notions of
non-discrimination. Id. at 1-2. In its Open Internet NPRM, the FCC fails to realize that dis-
crimination requires services to be identical-"labeling as 'discrimination' different prices for
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non-discrimination rule is not about discrimination, it is about price regulation.
And, even worse, the Commission's proposed price regulation rules in the
Open Internet NPRM are completely incompatible with the very statutory
mandate Mr. Genachowski now wants to re-impose on broadband service pro-
viders in the form of Sections 201 and 202. Traditional Title II jurisprudence
rejects the Commission's presumed "bright line" non-discrimination standard
in favor of the more nuanced concept of "undue" discrimination. Title II allows
carriers to sell different services at different prices, so long as all of the offer-
ings are available to similarly situated customers."o If the Open Internet NPRM
is adopted as currently drafted, however, carriers would be forced to sell two
completely different services (enhanced and standard service) for the same
price in evident violation of Section 202."
Second, the Commission currently has (at least) two proceedings open to
expand regulatory oversight-including pricing regulation-of broadband
transport. In the National Broadband Plan Public Notice #11, the Commission
requested information on the pricing, costs, and degree of competition in high
capacity broadband transport markets in an effort to address claims that a lack
of "adequate, reasonably priced, and efficiently provided access to middle and
second mile transport services and facilities play an important-if not gating-
role in the economics of broadband deployment."52 In the Special Access
NPRM, the Commission is specifically considering the expansion of price reg-
ulation over high capacity broadband data links, again contemplating a reversal
of earlier Commission actions, by (re)imposing price regulations on broadband
services."
different goods is a fundamental defect in the Commission's approach." Id. at 3-4.
50 See Orloff v. FCC, 352 F.3d 415, 420-421 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that commercial
mobile radio service (CMRS) provider's practice of granting sales concessions to some
prospective customers was a reasonable response to competitive market conditions and was
not "unjust or unreasonable" rate discrimination against other similarly-situated customers
in violation of the Communications Act). See, e.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC,
917 F.2d 30, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
5' See FoRD & SPIWAK, supra note 47, at 5-6. Moreover, it is important to note that, in
the Open Internet NPRM, the Commission tries to price regulate not under Sections 201 and
202, but under a tortured interpretation of Section 251. Id. at 4. However, such an approach
is wholly inconsistent with the Commission's original interpretation of Section 251 in 1996,
which clearly permitted pricing differentials for different services. See generally id.
52 Comment Sought on Impact of Middle and Second Mile Access on Broadband Avail-
ability and Deployment, NBP Public Notice #11, Public Notice, 24 F.C.C.R. 12,470 (Oct. 8,
2009). The services at issue are "transport and transmission of data communications." Id.
5 See In re Special Access Rates for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers, AT&T Corp.
Petition for Rulemaking to Reform Regulation of Incumbent local Exchange Carrier Rates
for Interstate Special Access Services, Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20
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While we make no particular claims here about the wisdom of these two
current investigations, we believe that these examples-coupled with the
Commission's blatant actions in the Open Internet NPRMto impose price reg-
ulation on Broadband Service Providers 54-presents strong evidence that this
Commission views price controls as a legitimate policy lever. The revisiting
and reversal of previous decisions is precisely the kind of temporally inconsis-
tent behavior that plagues the FCC's proposal.
But there is also other, less direct evidence that price regulation is on the ta-
ble. For example, in a recent FCC consumer survey conducted as part of the
National Broadband Plan, the FCC staff established a price point of $25 per
month as what people consider to be "affordable."" The mission of the Na-
tional Broadband Plan is "affordable broadband," and the Plan claims that the
largest barrier to adoption is price." Application of Section 201, as proposed
by the Commission, requires rates to be "affordable" (notwithstanding the fact
that the Act clearly contains no such arbitrary subjective standard, but rather a
fact-based inquiry into whether rates are "just and reasonable""). Thus, the
FCC's plain interest in price regulation of broadband services has been estab-
lished; a price exceeding $25 is "unaffordable"." Similarly, the National
Broadband Plan stated that the FCC intends to conduct a more granular mar-
ket-by-market analysis of the state of competition, including gathering and
analyzing price data." The National Broadband Plan proposes to "[c]ollect,
F.C.C.R. 1994, 2012-13, 51 (Jan. 31, 2005). See also GEORGE S. FORD & LAWRENCE J.
SPIWAK, PHOENIX CTR., PHOENIX CTR. POL'Y PAPER No. 35: THE NEED FOR BETTER ANALY-
SIS OF HIGH CAPACITY SERVICES 2-3 (Jun. 2009), available at http://www.phoenix-
center.org/pcpp/PCPP35Final.pdf; T. RANDOLPH BEARD ET AL., PHOENIX CTR., PHOENIX
CTR. POL'Y PAPER No. 37: MARKET DEFINITION AND THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SPECIAL
ACCESS REGULATION 2-3 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.phoenix-
center.org/pcpp/PCPP37Final.pdf.
54 See supra Part II.B.1 and accompanying notes 45-54; see generally FORD & SPIWAK
supra note 47 (discussing the FCC's proposal to implement regulations for the purpose of
preserving Open Internet).
55 John B. Horrigan, Broadband Adoption and Use in America 28 (Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n, OBI Working Paper Series No. 1, Feb. 2010), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-296442A I.pdf.
56 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 14, at 9, 167-168.
5 See Farmers Union Central Exchange v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1503-1505 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (the phrase "just and reasonable" is not "a mere vessel into which meaning must be
poured").
5 See Horrigan, supra note 55, at 28.
5 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 14, at 29 (stating that "continuous
collection and analysis of detailed data on competitive behavior must be the linchpin of
effective competition policy").
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analyze, benchmark and publish detailed, market-by-market information on
broadband pricing and competition . .. This will also enable the FCC and other
agencies to apply appropriate remedies when competition is lacking in specific
geographies or market segments.""o Although not definitive statements of in-
tent, the National Broadband Plan can easily be interpreted as opening the
door to price regulation as an appropriate remedy for prices that are deemed
unaffordable. More evidence that the Commission leans toward price regula-
tion is discussed in the next section, citing several examples of investigations
and proceedings underway at the agency.
2. This Commission has Already Attempted to Regulate the Wireless Industry
Although the FCC has classified wireless broadband as a Title I information
service since 2007,61 Chairman Genachowski maintains that his proposed
Third Way approach has been successfully applied to traditional wireless
communications.62 However, while it is indeed true that Congress gave the
Commission specific forbearance authority over the pricing provisions in Title
II pursuant to Section 332(c) of the Communications Act,13 CMRS services
remains subject to a plethora of regulations under both Title II and Title Il.'
As such, it is somewhat odd that the agency would appeal to their treatment of
the wireless industry to support its "light" touch.
More importantly, it does not appear that this Commission anticipates easing
the imposition of wireless regulations any time soon and is, in fact, considering
expanded regulation for such services in numerous proceedings. For example,
not only is the Commission currently contemplating subjecting wireless broad-
band providers to the pricing rules contained in the Open Internet NPRM, but
it is also still considering the potential application of mandatory "Wireless
Carterfone" rules,66 which could lead to higher handset prices" and perversely
60 Id. at XI (emphasis added).
61 In re Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over
Wireless Networks, Declaratory Ruling, 22 F.C.C.R. 5901, 5908-11, 18-28 (Mar. 23,
2007); In re Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over
Wireless Networks, Concurring Statement of Comm'r Michael J Copps, 22 F.C.C.R. 5927
(Mar. 23, 2007).
62 Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 6.
63 Schlick Statement, supra note 5, at 5; 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (2006).
64 Schlick Statement, supra note 5, at 5 (explaining that the FCC may not forbear from
enforcing sections 201, 202, and 208 under Title II and that the FCC has "direct jurisdiction
over licensing of wireless services under Title III).
65 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 2, 171-174.
66 See Id. T 25 (Carterfone rules required "phone compan[ies] to allow subscribers to
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create the incentive for wireless BSPs to engage in exclusionary conduct such
as sabotage.18 Moreover, last winter, the Commission requested information
about early termination fees ("ETFs"), asking the carriers to "describe the ra-
tionale for the increase in the ETF.""9 The ETF is an element of the price vec-
tor, and such inquisitions may be sensibly viewed as a prelude to price regula-
tion. Indeed, in the Commission's recent Wireless Competition Report, the
Commission described ETFs as "probably the largest quantifiable cost to con-
sumers who wish to switch service providers.""o Most recently, there is the
Commission's much heralded "Bill Shock" proceeding, which one can only
read as being expressly designed to challenge the current paradigm of no price
regulation and handset subsidies.'
attach their choice of devices to the network," leading to considerable innovation in phone
technology). See id. 163-170 (requesting comments regarding regulations that would
require broadband service providers to allow subscribers to use any device to access their
networks).
67 GEORGE S. FORD, ET AL., PHOENIX CTR. FOR THE ADVANCED LEGAL & ECON. PUB.
POL'Y. STUDIES PoL'Y PAPER No. 21, CONSUMERS AND WIRELESS CARTERFONE: AN Eco-
NOMIC PERSPECTIVE 9 (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.phoenix-
center.org/policybulletin/pcpb I 7final.pdf
68 GEORGE S. FORD, ET AL., PHOENIX CTR. FOR THE ADVANCED LEGAL & EcoN. PUB.
POL'Y. STUDIES POL'Y PAPER No. 17, WIRELESS NET NEUTRALITY: FROM CARTERFONE T
CABLE BOXES 5 (APR. 2007) available at http://www.phoenix-
center.org/policybulletin/PCPB 17Final.pdf.
69 Letter from Ruth Milkman, Chief, Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n [hereinafter Ruth Milkman], and Marc Stone, Acting Chief, Consumer and Gov't'l
Affairs Bureau, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, to Steven E. Zipperstein, Vice President of Legal
and External Affairs, General Counsel and Sec'y, Verizon Wireless (Dec. 4, 2009), 24
F.C.C.R. 14320, 14321, DA 09-2535. See e.g., letter from Joel Gurin, Chief of Consumer
and Gov't'l. Affairs Bureau, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n [hereinafter Joel Gurin] and Ruth
Milkman, to Robert Quinn, Senior Vice President - Federal Regulatory, AT&T Services,
Inc. (Jan. 26, 2010), 25 F.C.C.R. 918, DA 10-132; letter from Joel Gurin and Ruth Milk-
man, to Richard S. Whitt, Washington Telecom and Media Counsel, Google Inc. (Jan. 26,
2010), 25 F.C.C.R. 922, DA 10-133; letter from Joel Gurin and Ruth Milkman to Thomas J.
Sugrue, Vice President, Gov't Affairs, T-Mobile USA, Inc. (Jan. 26, 2010), 25 F.C.C.R.
933, DA 10-135; letter from Joel Gurin and Ruth Milkman to Kathleen Grillo, Senior Vice
President, Fed. Regulatory Affairs, Verizon (Jan. 26, 2010), 25 F.C.C.R. 937, DA 10-136;
Letter from Joel Gurin and Ruth Milkman to Vonya B. McCann, Senior Vice President,
Gov't Affairs, Sprint Nextel Corp. (Jan. 26, 2010), 25 F.C.C.R. 941, DA 10-137.
70 In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1993 Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With
Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Services, Fourteenth Report,
FCC 10-81, WT Docket No. 09-66, 234 (May 20, 2010) available at
http://fjallfoss.fec.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-81Al.pdf.
71 In re Empowering Consumers to Avoid Bill Shock, FCC 10-180, _ (rel. October 14,
2010); see also John Horrigan and Ellen Satterwhite, Americans' Perspectives on Early
Termination Fees and Bill Shock-Summary of Findings (May 26, 2010), available at
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The present Commission's focus on "affordable" pricing, which it appar-
ently believes is not widely available, is not limited to more direct attempts to
control the conduct of firms. In the National Broadband Plan, for example, the
agency proposes to "develop rules for one or more spectrum bands requiring
licensees to provide a free or very low-cost broadband service tier."72 This pro-
posal is aimed directly at addressing "the affordability barrier to adoption."73
Plainly, this Commission is committed to lowering prices for services using its
regulatory influence. As such, price regulation must be viewed as a genuine
threat to broadband firms.
Finally, we have the recent acquisition of Mobile Satellite Service ("MSS")
provider SkyTerra by Harbinger Capital Partners, which the Commission
snuck out the door on delegated authority to the International Bureau, the
Wireless Bureau, and the Office of Engineering and Technology.74 Although
the Bureau Chiefs raised serious concerns about the merged entity's potential
dominance of the MSS market (including a finding that Harbinger had owner-
ship positions in MSS competitor TerreStar, along with a variety of other wire-
less competitors)", what tipped the Bureau Chiefs' hands was their acceptance
of the merged entity's promise to build a "4G" terrestrial (as opposed to satel-
lite) wireless network that "will provide coverage in the United States to at
least 100 million people by December 31, 2012, at least 145 million people by
December 31, 2013, and at least 260 million people by December 31, 2015."76
While one can certainly see the appeal of Harbinger's offer, the Bureau
Chiefs went one step further by adopting a defacto spectrum cap without the
benefit of an opportunity for public notice and comment." In particular, Har-
http://hraunfoss.fec.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-298414Ai.pdf.
72 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 14, at 173.
73 Id.
74 In re Matter of SkyTerra Communications, Inc. and Harbinger Capital Partners
Funds, Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of SkyTerra Subsidiary, LLC, Me-
morandum Opinion and Order and Declaratory Ruling, 25 F.C.C.R. 3059, 3085 (hereinafter
the Harbinger Order).
75 Id. 53. Significantly, and germane to this paper, the Bureau Chiefs expressly recog-
nized that because "companies have changed their plans over the past years, both in re-
sponse to changing economic times and to changes in Commission rules," it is no wonder
why MSS companies' business plans remain, in the Bureau Chiefs' own words, "fluid." Id
54.
76 Id. 56.
7 Indeed, contrary to this Administration's promise of "transparency", although the ex
partes containing voluntary commitments were made on March 26, 2010, the Commission
did not post these ex partes on EDOCs until March 29th-three days after the order was
released. See Letter from Henry Goldberg, Attorney, to Marlene Dortch, Sec. of Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, (Mar. 26, 2010) (available at
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binger first promised that if it seeks to make spectrum available "to either of
the two largest terrestrial providers of CMRS and broadband services," the
merged entity must obtain Commission approval." Second, the merged entity
must live up to the order's proposed build-out schedule. Finally, the merged
entity must first obtain Commission approval before traffic to these largest
terrestrial providers' accounts for more than twenty five percent (25%) of
SkyTerra's total traffic on its terrestrial network in any Economic Area."
These "voluntary commitments" have no apparent nexus to any specific anti-
competitive harm revealed by the Bureau Chiefs' competitive analysis. Rather,
this "spectrum cap" regulation is nothing more than an inappropriate backdoor
attempt to regulate indirectly by adjudication rather than by industry-wide
rulemakings."
3. Any Notion that Forbearance is "Easy" Ignores Precedent
A critical component of the "Third Way" to regulate broadband services is
the application of forbearance authority to purge Title II regulation of its more
heavy-handed elements. Forbearance, however, is not an easy task and is un-
likely to be sufficiently applied. Although the Commission may set forth a list
of regulations it may seek to forbear on its own motion,"' given the complexity
of the issue, there will no doubt be multiple items left off this list that will
prompt additional petitions for forbearance from broadband service providers.
Moreover, the standard for forbearance is quite high, and there is no guarantee
of success. Forbearance will certainly be challenged by some parties, with such
protests having support from at least one Commissioner.82
Under Section 10 of the Communications Act (47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1)-(3)),
the Commission:
[S]hall forbear from applying any regulation or any provision of [the Communica-
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020397552). Thus, it was impossible by
administrative fiat to for the public to have an opportunity to comment on Harbinger's "vol-
untary commitment" of a defacto spectrum cap.
78 Harbinger Order, supra note 74, at 72.
79 Id. T 72.
80 Thomas M. Koutsky and Lawrence J. Spiwak, Separating Politics from Policy in
FCC Merger Reviews: A Basic Legal Primer of the "Public Interest" Standard, 18 CoM-
MLAW CONSPECTUS 329, 330 (2010).
8 See e.g., Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 5 (describing the Commissioner's
proposed Third Way approach to regulation); Schlick Statement, supra note 5, at 3-4.
82 As noted above, Commission Copps made clear that he "would have preferred plain
and simple Title II reclassification" and believes the Commission "must avoid another for-
bearance binge." Copps Statement, supra note 41, at 1.
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tions] Act to a telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service ... in any or
some of its or their geographic markets, if the Commission determines that:
(1) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure that the
charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by, for, or in connection with that
telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service are just and reasonable
and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory;
(2) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary for the protection
of consumers; and
(3) forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is consistent with the
public interest.
Moreover, in making its public interest determination under subsection (3),
the Commission shall consider whether forbearance from enforcing the provision or
regulation will promote competitive market conditions, including the extent to which
such forbearance will enhance competition among providers of telecommunications
services. If the Commission determines that such forbearance will promote competi-
tion among providers of telecommunications services, that determination may be the
basis for a Commission finding that forbearance is in the public interest.8 3
Although the Commission must act upon a request for forbearance within one
year,84 this is not an easy process for the petitioner. Not only does an applicant
bear both the "burden of proof' and the "burden of persuasion"," but the
Commission specifically rejected the argument that it has "an ongoing burden
to justify regulation"; stating that there is "no burden of proof on the Commis-
sion 'clearly' written into the statute. . . ."" By definition, therefore, any re-
classification of broadband transport as a "telecommunications service" would
immediately subject network operators to a bevy of regulations that the Com-
mission may (or may not), at its discretion, eventually decide to drop.
Furthermore, the Commission proposes simultaneously to regulate and for-
bear, and it is not clear how the statute can be sensibly interpreted to permit
both. For example, to forbear from price regulation, the Commission must
conclude that prices are "just and reasonable" and "not unjustly or unreasona-
bly discriminatory."" Since its National Broadband Plan concludes $25 is the
benchmark of "affordable" (i.e., what consumers are willing to pay)8 can the
83 Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 160(b).
84 Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 160(c).
85 In re Petition to Establish Procedural Requirements to Govern Proceedings for For-
bearance Under Section 10 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, REPORT AND
ORDER, 24 F.C.C.R. 9543, 9554, 20,21 (June 26, 2010).
86 Id. 22 (internal citations omitted).
87 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1).
88 John Horrigan, Broadband Adoption and Use in America 5 (OBI WORKING PAPER
SERIES No. 1 Feb. 2010), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-296442Al.pdf
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agency deregulate prices if they are not $25 or less? Moreover, can competi-
tion be sufficient to ensure that prices are "just and reasonable," but practices
are not? That is, is it sensible for the Commission to forbear from price regula-
tion due to competition, but then apply "practices" regulation (e.g., under Net-
work Neutrality) due to a lack of competition? The potential for conflict in
simultaneously regulating and forbearing is apparent, and the Commission has
yet to set forth how it plans to avoid such inherent contradictions.
4. The Commission Cannot Pre-Commit to Leave Forbearance Intact
It is well established in Administrative Law that an agency is permitted to
change course provided that they articulate "a good reason" for the change."
Thus, as Commissioner Clyburn recently conceded, "there is no such thing as
'certainty' in the regulatory context. Beyond constitutional constraints, cer-
tainty is just not a reality under any regulatory framework.""o Commissioner
Clyburn argues, therefore, that instead of efforts to promote regulatory cer-
tainty, "[m]aybe the more accurate term then is regulatory predictability. That
is, industry is searching for a reasonable probability that any one course will
continue. Framing it this way at least recognizes the fact that any assumptions
on which long-term investments are based have some non-zero chance of being
undermined."9'
The distinction between "predictability" and "uncertainty" is a distinc-
tion without a difference. As observed by scientist Yuejian Zhu, "[i]ncreases in
forecast predictability always correspond to decreases in forecast uncer-
tainty."92 But whether one calls it "regulatory certainty" or "regulatory predict-
ability," the present case does not concern something as trivial as the FCC's
new approach to handle a "wardrobe malfunction" but the capital market's
reaction to the FCC's stated intention to radically change course after the pri-
vate sector has invested (and sunk) hundreds of billions of dollars in reliance of
a policy of "light regulatory touch," exogenously enforced by the courts, under
the Commission's Title I ancillary jurisdiction.
This is why Chairman Genachowski's and Mr. Schlick's claims that the
FCC has never reversed itself ring so hollow." As evidenced by the Commis-
89 See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S.Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009).
90 Clyburn June 3, 2010 Speech, supra note 38, at 3.
91 Id. at 4.
92 Yuejian Zhu, Ensemble Forecast: A New Approach to Uncertainty and Predictability,
22 ADVANCES IN ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES 781, 782 (2005).
93 See Schlick Statement, supra note 5, at 9 (explaining how the FCC "has never re-
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sion's apparent willingness to reverse nearly six years of bi-partisan agreement
(and findings of fact upheld by the courts)9 4 holding that broadband services
should be treated as an interstate service under Title I, no unbiased observer
would be likely to expect that regulators will not reverse course when circum-
stances are propitious.
Ironically, the reclassification decision itself reverses an earlier decision to
classify broadband access as a Title I service." Broadband service providers
were signaled by the Commission, and affirmed by the courts, that they could
make long-term investment decisions based on Title I classification.96 The
Commission now proposes to radically modify the regulatory scheme. This
reversal of the agency's previous regulatory posture demonstrates that a sitting
administration cannot credibly bind the actions of future administrations. In-
deed, current Commissioner and former Acting-Chairman Copps has explicitly
noted his preference for "plain and simple Title II reclassification through a
declaratory ruling."97
5. Despite its Protestations, the Commission Continues to Send Signals that
Unbundling is Back on the Table
Another example of the FCC's light touch for advanced services was the de-
liberate decision to allow local exchange companies to "invest their way out of
regulation" by exempting "new wires" (i.e., fiber) from requirements to un-
bundle legacy copper networks." Although Chairman Genachowski stated that
his "Third Way" would "not change established policy ... to unbundling"99,
versed a forbearance determination made under section 10, nor one made for wireless under
the similar criteria of section 332 (c) (1); Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 5.
94 See Letter From Members of Congress, to Julius Genachowski, Chairman of Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n (May 24, 2010) (signed by 74 House Democrats); Letter from Mem-
bers of U.S. Senate, to Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed Commc'ns Comm'n (May 24,
2010) (signed by 37 Senate Republicans).
9 See Nat'1 Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 968-
969 (2005).
96 Id. at 1001-1002.
97 See Copps Statement, supra note 41
at 1.
9 See Tom Tauke, A New Principle for a New Era: The Courage to Let Broadband
Grow, Address at NARUC/NECA National Broadband Summit (Apr. 28, 2003) (referenc-
ing his 2001 Old Wires, Old Rules/New Wires, New Rules speech in Aspen, CO). See also
William H. Dutton, Sharon E. Gillett, Lee W. McKnight & Malcolm Peltu, Bridging broad-
band Internet divides: reconfiguring access to enhance communicative power, 19 JOURNAL
OF INFo. TECH. 28-38 (March 2004).
99 Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 5.
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the FCC nonetheless keeps making repeated overtures that unbundling, or the
requirement that incumbent local phone companies lease portions of their net-
works at regulated prices to facilitate retail competition, may be back on the
table.
By way of background, unbundling was never designed to create a static, in-
cumbent-centric perpetual resale market." Rather, in the same vein as the
FCC's WATTs Resale and Competitive Carrier paradigms of the late seventies
and 1980s, the purpose of unbundling was to stimulate and consolidate new,
non-incumbent demand to justify the construction of alternative networks."'
Yet, as the telecom bubble of the 1990's bore out, the economics of the busi-
ness dictated that the number of wireline networks would be few.' 2 Given that
the majority of Americans now have access to both a cable and telecommuni-
cations provider,"' both of which offer assorted packages of voice, data and
video (not to mention the addition of imperfect substitution from multiple
wireless providers), a strong argument can be made that the original objectives
of the 1996 Act have been met.'"
Notwithstanding, there are several provisions in Chapter 4 of the National
Broadband Plan that refer to "wholesale competition regulations." Although
the Plan did not call for a return to unbundling outright, the Plan did recom-
mend that the "FCC should comprehensively review its wholesale competition
10 See T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Why ADCo? Why
Now? An Economic Exploration into the Future Industry Structure for the "Last Mile" in
Local Telecommunications Markets, 54 FED. COM. L. J. 421, 422-425 (2002) (describing
how unbundling creates a non-incumbent demand for competitive infrastructure).
1o See Final Acts of the World Administrative Telegraph and Telephone Conference
Melbourne, 1988 (Wattc-99): International Telecommunication Regulations, INT'L TELE-
COMM. UNION 3-8 (1989), available at http://itu.int/dmspub/itu-
s/oth/02/01/s02010000214002PDFE.pdf; see Dean Burch, Common Carrier Communica-
tions by Wire and Radio: A Retrospective, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 85, 88-91 (1985); see Jerry
A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve Its Purpose? Empiri-
cal Evidence From Five Countries, 1 J. COMP. L. & EcON. 173, 182-183 (2005).
102 See Beard, supra note 100, at 422-425 (describing how prevailing market conditions
limited the number of wire line networks).
103 Hausman, supra note 101, at 181; see In re A National Broadband Plan for Our Fu-
ture, Comments of the United States Telecom Ass'n), GN Docket No. 09-51, at 3-4 (June 8,
2009),
http://www.ustelecom.org/uploadedfiles/issues/filings/20090608 comments.USTelecom.Br
oadband.NOI.GN.09.51.pdf (describing how "over 90%" of American households have
access to "wireline or a cable broadband service" while nearly "four-fifths of U.S. house-
holds have access to both.").
'0 See Jim Robbins, The 1996 Telecommunications Act, 58 FED, COMM. L.J. 559, 560-
563, 568 (2006) (describing the effects of recent legislation that facilitated the rise of differ-
ent voice, data and multimedia packages from broadband providers).
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regulations to develop a coherent and effective framework and take expedited
action based on that framework to ensure widespread availability of inputs for
broadband services provided to small businesses, mobile providers, and enter-
prise customers."' 5 According to the Commission, this inquiry specifically
includes "competitive access to local fiber facilities." 06 Moreover, there also
appears to be some Congressional support for the Commission's suggestion,"'
and a Commission-sanctioned study explicitly called for the use of unbundling
to spur broadband adoption.'
In the same vein, the Commission recently denied a petition by Qwest
Communications for forbearance of certain unbundling obligations in the
Phoenix area.' 9 Yet, what is significant about this Order is not the fact that the
Commission denied the petition, but that the Commission rejected the legal
standard it used in all of its prior forbearance precedent in favor of a far stricter
standard that may, in practice, be impossible to overcome." 0 Specifically, in-
stead of focusing on whether or not the market was workably competitive (i.e.,
performance), the Commission reverted back to a "counting heads" analysis of
the number of firms in the market to determine whether the incumbent pos-
1os NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 14, at 36.
106 See id. at 48 (citing to Pleading Cycle Established For Comments On Petition For
Expedited Rulemaking Regarding Section 271 Unbundling Obligations, Public Notice, 24
F.C.C.R. 14,514 (Dec. 14, 2009); Comment Sought On Maine Public Utilities Commission
Petition For Declaratory Ruling Regarding Section 271 Access to Dark Fiber Facilities And
Line Sharing, Public Notice, 25 F.C.C.R. 372 (Jan. 15, 2010).
107 Transcript of Oversight of the Federal Communications Commission: The National
Broadband Plan: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Commc'ns, Tech., and the Internet
of the H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 178-179 (Mar. 25, 2010), avail-
able at http://energycommerce.house.ogv/press 111/20100325/transcript.03.25.210.cti.pdf.
108 THE BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY, NEXT
GENERATION CONNECTIVITY: A REIVEW OF BROADBAND INTERNET TRANSITIONS AND POLICY
FROM AROUND THE WORLD (Feb. 2010), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/newsroom/broadband reviewfinal); Yochai Benkler, Ending
the Internet's Trench Warfare, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, March 21, 2010, at WKl2. For a
forceful dismantling of the Berkman Study, see GEORGE S. FORD, PHOENIX CTR. FOR THE
ADVANCED LEGAL & ECON. PUB. POL'Y. STUDIES, WHOOPS! BERKMAN STUDY SHOWS "OPEN
ACCESS" REDUCES BROADBAND CONSUMPTION (NOv. 12, 2009), available at
http://www.phoenix-center.org/perspectives/Perspective09-05Final.pdf.
109 In re Matter of Petition of Qwest Corporation for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C.
§ 160(c) in the Phoenix, Arizona Metropolitan Statistical Area, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, FCC 10-113, 25 F.C.C.R. 8622, 8623 (June 15, 2010).
"o George S. Ford and Lawrence J. Spiwak, PHOENIX CENTER PERsPECTIVE No. 10-
08, The Impossible Dream: Forbearance After the Phoenix Order (Dec. 16, 2010) available
at http://www.phoenix-center.org/perspectives/Perspective 1 0-08Final.pdf (showing that the
FCC's new "market power" analysis requires price to equal marginal cost).
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the number of firms in the market to determine whether the incumbent pos-
sessed market power."' Given that 1) the economics of the business dictate
that industry structure will always be highly concentrated and characterized by
few firms; and 2) just as importantly, such concentration, in the face of high
fixed and sunk costs, does not necessarily mean a market may be performing
poorly (in fact, such structure may indicate the presence of intense price com-
petition)." 2 The Commission's new approach to forbearance virtually guaran-
tees that unbundling obligations will remain on the books, regardless of
whether the costs of those regulations outweigh the public interest benefits."'
For better or worse, the United States' ten year experiment with forcing lo-
cal exchange carriers to unbundle their legacy local copper loops came to a
screeching halt with the D.C. Circuit's decision in USTA II. "' There, the Court
found that, despite repeated attempts by the Commission to define adequately
the "necessary" and "impair" standard of Section 251, the Commission simply
could not come up with a standard with sufficient granularity to write enforce-
able rules."' If the FCC could not write legally sustainable rules to unbundle
the legacy copper network in a monopoly environment, it strains credulity to
think that the FCC could draft legally sustainable unbundling rules for fiber
and coaxial cable, and possibly even mobile broadband networks, in the cur-
rent workably competitive broadband environment.
Yet, as noted above, so long as the Commission continues to make overtures
to revisit unbundling, the Commission's credibility in this regard is very much
in doubt. From an incumbent investor standpoint, there is a real risk that the
government will again seek to reduce profitability; and from a CLEC investor
"' Id 41-45.
112 See generally, George. S. Ford, T. M. Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Competition
After Unbundling: Entry, Industry Structure and Convergence, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 331,
332-3334, 337-348 (2007).
113 See In re Petition of Qwest Corporation, supra note 109, 1 90:
We find that de novo entry is equally unlikely. As discussed above, in the Triennial
Review Order, the Commission found that competitive carriers face extensive eco-
nomic barriers to the construction of last-mile facilities. Congress enacted and the
Commission implemented the UNE framework in an attempt to lower barriers to entry
and to create a viable platform for entry into the local market. We see nothing in the re-
cord to indicate that the passage of time has lowered these barriers for competitive
LECs that do not already have an extensive local network used to provide other ser-
vices to enterprise locations today. (Internal Citations Omitted)
Id.
114 Rebecca Arbogast, FCC's Broadband Quartet: A State-Federal Fugue or Feud?, 2 J.
ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L 245, 252 (2003); United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC (US-
TA II), 359 F.3d 554, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
"s USTA II, 359 F.3d at 563, 571-573.
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standpoint, as the entire unbundling experience of the telecom bubble sends a
clear message that what the government can give one moment the government
can take away the next, why would any rational investor risk one dime of pre-
cious capital in another CLEC only to be burned twice?
III. RECLASSIFICATION AND INVESTMENT: THEORY AND
EVIDENCE
A core message of the National Broadband Plan is that government must do
what it can to encourage private investment in broadband infrastructure." 6 In-
vestment effects have proven to be a key component in all legislative and regu-
latory debates regarding the communications industries."' Reclassification is
no exception, and the Statements reflect concern for the effects of reclassifica-
tion for capital expenditures on broadband infrastructure. Chairman Gena-
chowski, for example, contends that the basic goal of broadband policy is "to
encourage private investment and the building of a communications infrastruc-
ture,"" but he expresses concern that "[h]eavy-handed prescriptive regulation
can chill investment and innovation."" Nonetheless, the Chairman proposes
reclassification of broadband services, and also proposes that the agency
"[s]imultaneously renounce .. . application of the many sections of the Com-
munications Act that are unnecessary and inappropriate for broadband access
service; and [p]ut in place up-front forbearance and meaningful boundaries to
guard against regulatory overreach." 2" In effect, the Chairman proposes to ex-
pose the industry to "heavy-handed" regulation but then have the agency re-
strain itself in applying much of it.
Restraint is, obviously, a choice and a decision that no single person at a
16 See NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 14, at 9, (explaining how the plan "ad-
dresses the troubling gaps and unrealized opportunities in broadband in America by recom-
mending ways federal, state and local governments can unleash private investment. . . .").
117 See e.g., Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Jen Howard, Spokesperson, FCC
Statement on Comcast v. FCC Decision (Apr. 6, 2010) (on file with author); In re Inquiry
Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Internet
Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to
the Internet Over Cable Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4840, 173 (Mar. 14, 2002).
118 Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 1-4; Schlick Statement, supra note 5, at 3;
In re Framework for Broadband Internet Service, Reply Comments of the Telecommunica-
tions Industry Association, GN Docket No. 10-127, 1, 22-23 (Aug. 12, 2010) [hereinafter
TIA Comments].
119 Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 1-4.
120 Id. at 5.
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regulatory agency has the authority to make. Whether or not self-directed "for-
bearance" and self-imposed "boundaries" will be sufficient, or could be credi-
bly implemented and enforced, is unknown. Therefore, it is fair to say that re-
classification will expose with a positive and increased probability, the Inter-
net to "heavy-handed" regulations that "chill investment.""' In other words, it
seems fair to say that the existence of strong authority under Title II will not
diminish, but will in fact increase the chances that ultimately, the broadband
firms face significant price regulation.
Thus, all Internet firms, and particularly broadband service providers, would
plausibly and reasonably incorporate a higher probability of prescriptive regu-
lation into their investment decisions upon reclassification. By the Chairman's
own logic, this higher probability will "chill investment." 22 In contrast, the
existing approach of the Commission to "not regulate the Internet" and "[re-
fraining] from regulation when possible," has "promot[ed] investment in the
Internet and broadband technologies . . . ." 23
In the next section, we present a theoretical model of investment decisions.
In this model, firms face a probability of "strong" regulation (i.e., heavy-
handed, prescriptive regulation) in future periods. Investment decisions are
made based on expectations regarding the strength of future regulation. This
model matches closely the present scenario of the potential introduction of a
Title II framework for the regulation of broadband Internet services. It is clear
that the introduction of Title II regulation will affect the potential investor in
several complex ways. However, from the provider's point-of-view, as Chair-
man Genachowski observed, the relevant issue is the provider's ability to earn
"a healthy return on investment", which "is a necessary and desirable incentive
to risk-taking and deployment of capital."' 24 The nature, extent, and severity of
any regulation materially affects prospective returns, and the Chairman has
already recognized that Title II regulation reduces returns and chills investment
incentives.
In addition, discussion of potential reclassification of broadband services has
at times emphasized that the implementation of Title II would go some dis-
tance in reducing uncertainty inherent in the current environment. Chairman
Genachowski believes staying the course "creates serious uncertainty about the
Commission's ability, under this approach, to perform the basic oversight
121 Id. at 2-5. See TIA Comments, supra note 118.
122 See Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 2 (describing the chilling effect of
heavy-handed prescriptive regulation on investment and innovation).
123 Schlick Statement, supra note 5, at 1-2.
124 Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 3.
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functions, and pursue the basic broadband-related policies, that have been long
and widely thought essential and appropriate,"'25 and that reclassification "eli-
minat[es] as much of the current uncertainty as possible."' 26 Likewise, Mr.
Schlick claims, "stick[ing] with the information service classification . .. is a
recipe for prolonged uncertainty. . . The extended uncertainty would deprive
investors . .. of needed clarity about the rules of the road."' 27
These linkages between uncertainty and investment tend to confuse the ideas
of uncertainty, and profitability. Investment is deterred by greater uncertainty
when the uncertainty affects the spread of the returns on investments.'28 Reduc-
ing regulatory uncertainty by making heavy-handed regulation more likely
reduces average investment returns. Therefore, in this instance, a reduction in
uncertainty is accompanied by a reduction in expected returns. We will illus-
trate the effects of regulatory uncertainty on investment using theoretical
analysis first, and then discuss the linkage between the theory and the empiri-
cal tests presented above.
A. Theoretical Model
In section II.A above, we considered a simple game between a firm contem-
plating an investment decision, and a regulator. This model, though very ab-
stract, illustrated a basic inefficiency inherent in many regulatory situations:
the regulator is generally unable to bind its future actions in a credible manner,
leading to diminished incentives for firms to make welfare-improving invest-
ments. However, one may legitimately object that the circumstances described
in this model are too simple: the future behavior of regulators cannot be de-
duced in advance, given the uncertainties of economic circumstances, political
events, technological changes, and so on.
The basic point made earlier continues to apply, and in a more nuanced way,
when these inherent uncertainties are explicitly included in the analysis. Our
125 Id. at 3-4.
126 Id. at 5.
127 Schlick Statement, supra note 5, at 2-3.
128 See Warren G. Lavey, Making and Keeping Regulatory Promises, 55 FED. COMM.
L.J. 1, 7-8 (2003) (citing Joint Application of AT&T Corp. and Telec-communications, Inc.
for Transfer of Control to AT&T Licenses and Authorizations Held by TCI and Its Affiliates
or Subsidiaries, AT&T's and TCI's Joint Reply to Comments and Joint Opposition to Peti-
tions to Deny or to Impose Conditions, CS Docket No. 98-178, app. B, at 20-21 (filed Nov.
13, 1998)). See TIA Comments, supra note 118, at 20 (commenting that "unsurprisingly, the
investment-deterrent effect of regulation increases as more Title II obligations are applied,
substantially reducing the 'net present value' of a proposed investment.").
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that the diminished investment phenomenon can be intuitively related to the
practical problem facing the FCC; whether or not to regulate broadband ser-
vices using the Title II framework. Our conceptualization of this issue is
straightforward. We will view Title II classification as resulting in an increase
in the probability of strong regulatory intervention, and we will show that, giv-
en this effect, Title II will reduce investment.
In the interest of the simplest presentation of the core issue, we consider a
two-period model with only two agents, a broadband firm B and a socially-
directed regulator F. While one could presumably always argue against any
expansion of regulatory authority by resorting to the claim that the regulators
would act inefficiently or in opposition to the public interest, such claims are
not the focus of our analysis. We will assume throughout that the regulator acts
to maximize social benefits given current circumstances.
The potential investor B must decide on the level of sunk investment, de-
noted k, to make in furtherance of its business plans. The difficulty, as is often
the case, is that the potential investor is both uncertain about the nature of fu-
ture regulation, and recognizes that it will find itself in a weak position vis-f-
vis the regulator due to its inability to recover previous investment costs
through exit or asset sales. The firm that makes an irreversible investment fac-
es a risk that the regulator, acting to maximize total surplus in some future pe-
riod, will act so as to preclude full recovery of the costs after the investments
are sunk.'29 Surplus maximization in the future does not imply surplus maximi-
zation today, and this theoretical analysis demonstrates this idea, as did the
game theoretical analysis above.
Uncertainty (or lack of predictability) over the regulator's policy can mean
that the regulator's future behavior is unknown ex ante. From the firm's stand-
point, though, uncertainty is relevant only insofar as it concerns the returns
available; the "nuts and bolts" of the regulatory mechanism are of secondary
importance compared to the firm's ability to satisfy creditors and obtain in-
vestment capital.' Thus, let 0 denote the probability the firm assigns to facing
strong regulation, and let 1 - 0 denote the corresponding probability that regu-
129 See Elizabeth Olmsted Teisburg, Capital Investment Strategies under Uncertain
Regulation, 24 RAND J. EcoN. 591, 593-594 (1993) (providing an overview of the prob-
lems firms may face with large capital investments that are irreversible, and the subsequent
uncertainty from future government regulation).
130 See A. Miguel Mirquez Garcia & M. Jestis Hernndez Ortiz, Firms Facing Uncer-
tainty: The Cooperation Option, in MANAGING UNCERTAINTY: THEORY & PRACTICE 435
(Constantin Zopandis & Panos M. Pardalos eds., Kluwer Academic 1998) (illustrating sev-
eral different attitudes in how firms may approach future uncertainty).
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lation is relaxed. Although we will assign very specific meanings to "strong"
and "relaxed" regulation in what follows, our argument does not depend on
these specific interpretations, as will be seen below.
The order of actions is as follows. First, both the regulator and firm observe
0. Second, the firm makes an irreversible investment k, with cost r-k, where
r, k > 0. This investment choice determines the firm's costs of providing ser-
vice, given by TC = c(k)Q + rk, where Q is the quantity of service produced
per period, c(k) is the unit costs of service, and r is the cost per unit of idiosyn-
cratic capital investment k. We assume, in accord with standard economics,
that c is decreasing in k, but at a decreasing rate, so that c'<0, c" > 0. (So c is a
convex, decreasing function of k).
Third, the nature of the regulatory environment is revealed: with probability
0 the firm will be subjected to "strict" regulation, which we take to mean the
regulator F will engage in social welfare maximizing price regulation of the
firm. In contrast, with probability 1 - 0, the resulting regulation will be "re-
laxed", meaning that prices will not be regulated, and the firm may act rela-
tively freely to set prices and so on. (Although these two outcomes are very
different, we will show that they may be relaxed below.)
In order to solve the firm's investment problem, we first consider the firm's
behavior under relaxed regulatory oversight. In this case, we may presume that
the firm selects prices, given unit cost c(k), to solve the problem:
TE = [(p - c)Q(p)] (1)
where Q(p) is the market quantity demanded at price p and 7tR represents the
firm's profits (ignoring the capital investment cost rk). Thus, in this case the
firm sets prices to maximize its retums. Application of the envelope theorem
establishes that 71R is decreasing in unit cost c: &ER/c = -Q < 0.
In contrast, suppose that the strong regulatory regime is imposed, as occurs
with probability theta (0). In this case, the regulator F will set prices directly to
maximize the sum of producer and consumer surplus. This results in a price of
c(k) per unit. Notice here that, given the circumstances in which it finds itself,
the regulator F is behaving precisely in the social interest should this eventual-
ity come to pass.
Having determined the possible future circumstances in which it might find
itself, B faces the following investment maximization problem:
max 7T(k, 0) = (1 - 0) 7CR(c(k))-rk (2)
where the maximization is performed over k for the given value of 0. Here, we
introduce a standard technical assumption: the "profit function" given by the
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introduce a standard technical assumption: the "profit function" given by the
solution to this problem is well-defined, so that the underlying cost and de-
mand conditions are consistent with this program being concave. In this case,
the unique maximal solution is found by solving the condition al(k*,0)/ak = 0.
This relationship specifies the optimal investment choice k* as a function of
the probability of strong ex post optimal regulation 0. In other words, the
firm's choice of investment depends on the probabilities with which different
sorts of future regulation will occur.
We turn next to the critical issue: how will a change in 0, the probability of
"strong" regulation, affect investment k*? This question has an immediate an-
swer in this simple behavioral model:
ak a 2 / aka
(3)
86 -82x[/6k2
In words, an increase in the probability of the strong (ex post social welfare
maximizing) regulation will reduce the initial investment of the firm, and the-
reby reduce ultimate service levels, and increase unit costs.
The mechanism described above is not novel: this effect has long been a
concern in regulatory settings where substantial sunk investments are made
and regulators are unable to credibly pre-commit to their future behavior.132
However, the presentation given here illustrates, in a realistic way, the likely
effects of the service reclassification dynamic associated with the Title II regu-
131 The denominator is positive by concavity (for maximization), so the numerator signs
the expression. The numerator can be written as (O82/8c)(8c/8k) < 0, where aX2/ac < 0 and
ac/ak < 0. Thus, the numerator is negative and the sign of the expression is negative.
132 Teisberg, supra note 128, at 591-604. See also Jean Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole,
Should Governments Commit?, 36 EUROPEAN ECON. REv. 345-353 (1992); Paul de Bijl &
Martin Peitz, REGULATION AND ENTRY INTO TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS 246 (2002):
"if the regulator cannot pre-commit to such principles, operators face regulatory uncer
tainty when taking investment decisions. In particular, entrants may start more cautiously
to see which regulation applies in the segments with competition to update their beliefs
about regulation that will prevail in other market segments. The consequence of such
staggered entry is a delay in investment. As a result, the market as a whole matures more
slowly, that is, entrants choose a smaller coverage, or roll out a less elaborate network,
than without regulatory uncertainty. This increases the need for heavy regulation for two
reasons. Firstly, larger parts of the market remain a monopoly; and secondly, regulatory
uncertainty favors entry modes in which sunk costs are low. This implies that overall
regulatory uncertainty creates a bias in favor of resale-based entry and against facilities-
based entry."
Id.
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lation of broadband. Regulation is a complex, multifaceted undertaking, and it
is not easy to accurately describe it in simple terms. Yet, the following facts
are indubitable.
First, in contrast to the arguments of Chairman Genachowski, Austin
Schlick, and Commissioner Clybum, uncertainty about the nature of future
regulation is not, per se, an issue. Rather, when people complain about such
uncertainty, they usually really mean that investment returns are unknown be-
cause the nature or severity of regulation is unknown. In this model, the pa-
rameter 0 represents this uncertainty. Notice, though, that any change in 0 that
moves 0 closer to the midpoint (0 = 2) is an increase in uncertainty, while
moves of 0 closer to the endpoints 0 and 1 are "reductions" in uncertainty. But,
any increase in 0, whether constituting an increase or a reduction in uncer-
tainty, will reduce investment and raise unit costs of service. Thus, the claim
that Title II will reduce uncertainty, even if true, is not relevant to investment
levels, welfare, or prices.
Second, as discussed above in Section II, FCC actions suggest that Title I
will amount to an increased probability of strong, price regulation of broad-
band services. Both common sense and empirical evidence support this inter-
pretation. Thus, in this sense, the effect of Title II reclassification will be given
as an increase in 0 in this model. This finding is not due to any claim that the
FCC will behave contrary to the public interest in the future; on the contrary,
we assume they will behave as perfect ex post welfare maximizers. But the
FCC, as a government body with political administration, cannot, as a matter
of policy, constrain future lawful acts of the FCC through lawful acts today.'
This constraint, though, has at least one unfortunate consequence, and the in-
vestment reduction affects described there are an example of this.
Finally, it is not the case that our findings depend, in any strict sense, on the
exact regulatory actions we described as strong or relaxed. For example, the
finding persists if the strong regulatory regime allows for some mark-up in
pricing, so prices exceed marginal cost (c). Similarly, the relaxed regime need
not be completely unregulated. What is essential for our finding is that the
strict regime reduces profits attendant on the investment in a substantial way
compared to the relaxed regulation outcome.
133 See Genachowski Statement, supra note 3 at 5; Schlick Statement, supra note 5, at 8
(noting that "neither approach would, could, or should absolutely prevent the Commission
from adjusting its future policies in light of changed circumstances.")
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B. From Theory to Empirics
Chairman Genachowski's view that "[h]eavy-handed prescriptive regulation
can chill investment"'34 is supported by economic theory. Now, the question is
whether there is empirical evidence to further confirm the relationship between
broadband investment and reclassification. To that end, we turn to financial
theory to develop an empiric model.
As explained by Tobin, "the rate of investment-the speed at which inves-
tors wish to increase the capital stock-should be related, if to anything to q,
the value of capital relative to its replacement cost." 35 This "q" is a financial
statistic computed as the ratio of market value to replacement value. The q-
theory of investment holds that as q rises, investment rises. The theory is
widely used in the economics and finance literature. Chirinko, in his thorough
review of the statistical analysis of investment, explains that the q-theory of
investment "has been the most popular explicit model in empirical investment
studies.""'
The q-theory is useful here because market capitalization-that is, the value
of common stock-is a significant element of the numerator of the q-ratio.'
Changes in stock returns imply changes in the q-ratio, and by the q-theory,
changes in the rate of investment.' Therefore, from this evidence, it is possi-
ble to shed light on additional investment in broadband infrastructure resulting
from reclassification.
In the Statements, both Chairman Genachowski and Mr. Schlick allege that
the "Third Way" is not a highly regulatory approach to broadband rules, and as
such should not attenuate private investment in the sector. Chairman Gena-
chowski claims that reclassification "would not change the range of obligations
that broadband access service providers faced pre-Comcast," and Mr. Schlick
134 Genachowski Statement, supra note 3 at 2.
13 James Tobin, A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory, in ESSAYS IN
ECONOMICS: MACROECONOMICs 330 (Vol. 1, 1981).
136 Robert S. Chirinko, Business Fixed Investment Spending: Modeling Strategies, Em-
pirical Results, and Policy Implications, 31 JOURNAL OF ECON. LIT. 1875, 1889 (1993).
13 See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan and Luigi Zingales, Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivi-
ties Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?, 112 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF
ECON. 169 (1997); Timothy Erickson and Toni M. Whited, Measurement Error and the
Relationship between Investment and "q ", 108 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1027
(2000).
38 Eric B. Lindenberg & Stephen A. Ross, Tobin's "q" Ration and Industrial Organiza-
tion, 54 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 1-32 (1981). "Financial price data provide a viewing window
into the firm through the market's valuation of the securities issued by the firm and the
changes in these values over time." Id. at 1.
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asserts that the "Third Way" would "preserve the status quo, not change it.""
If reclassification merely preserves the status quo and leaves unchanged regu-
latory obligations, then the financial markets should view reclassification as an
innocuous regulatory event. But if the markets respond negatively, then inves-
tors can be assumed to have concluded that the Commission lacks the neces-
sary credibility for "light touch" regulation.
In this Section, we conduct a brief empirical examination of the financial
markets' reaction to the FCC's proposal. We utilize the widely-accepted event
study methodology for this purpose.'40 Our empirical analysis is straightfor-
ward. To discern the financial market response to reclassification, we gathered
data on stock price returns for broadband providers in the multichannel video
distribution business (i.e., cable operators). We also collected such data on
video distributors with no significant presence in the broadband access busi-
ness (i.e., satellite providers). If the financial markets find the Commission's
"light touch" approach to be credible, then stock returns should be largely un-
affected by the reclassification proposal. This logic suggests that we may ex-
amine stock prices at the instant of the relevant announcement, and assess the
FCC's credibility (as far as the capital markets are concerned) by testing for
significant effects in those price series.
1. Econometric Model
Following Karafiath, let t = 1, 2, . . . T denote the pre-event time period and
t = T + 1, . . . , T + N denote the event period.14' The regression model is:
T+N
Rj, =u+piRmt + Y;,D,,i+8t, (4)
T+1
where Rj, denotes the daily return (i.e., log different) on securityj at time t, Rmt
is the return on the market index at time t, and D,, is a dummy variable that is
13 Schlick Statement, supra note 5, at 8.
140 For reviews of the event study, see, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat, Event Studies and the Law;
Part I: Technique and Corporate Litigation, 4 AMER. L. AND EcoN. REV. 141 (2002); Wil-
liam H. Wells, A Beginner's Guide to Event Studies, 22 JOURNAL OF INSURANCE REGULA-
TION 61 (2004).
14' See, e.g., Imre Karafiath, Using Dummy Variables in the Event Methodology, 23 THE
FINANCIAL REv. 351 (1988). See also John J. Glascock & Imre Karafiath, Statistical infer-
ence in Event Studies Using Multiple Regression, in ALTERNATIVE IDEAS IN REAL ESTATE
INVESTMENT: RESEARCH ISSUES IN REAL ESTATE SERVICE 177-189 (A. Schwartz ed. 2000).
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equal to one at time T and zero otherwise. The coefficient Pf is the financial
Beta for security j; yj, is the excess return on security j at time t. The event
study focuses on the statistical significance of the y values, or the sum thereof.
Since Khotari and Warner pointed out the advantages of "short term" event
studies, the pre-event period consists of daily returns for a year prior to the
event (T = 250) and we set a five-day event period (so there are five "pulse"
dummy variables, for a total sample of 255 observations).'42 The Statements
were released on May 6, 2010, so the event dummies include five dummy vari-
ables for the dates May 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.
Equation (4) is estimated by ordinary least squares for four cable companies:
Comcast (CMCSA); Time Warner Cable (TWC); Cablevision Systems (CVC);
and Mediacom Communications (MCCC). To ensure that the effects for the
cable companies are related to the reclassification and not some video industry
shock of another sort, we also estimate the equation for satellite multichannel
video distributors DirecTV (DTV) and Dish Network (DISH). Neither satellite
company is a meaningful provider of broadband Internet services, so we use
these two firms as a "control group" for video-industry shocks coincident with
the event window.
2. Results
Results are summarized in Table 1. The R2 values are typical for stock re-
turn regressions. Provided in the table are the coefficients and t-statistics for
each of the pulse dummy variables. The null hypothesis-that reclassification
maintains the status quo (the stock price effect is zero)-is evaluated by a test
that the sum of the y coefficients equals zero. The test statistic for this latter
2test is distributed 2 with one degree of freedom (a log likelihood test of the
coefficient restriction). 14 The critical values from the X2 distribution are 3.84 at
the 5% level and 2.71 at the 10% level.
142 S.P. Khotari & Jerold B. Warner, Econometrics of Event Studies, in HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE FINANCE: VOL. 1, (B. Espen Eckbo, ed. 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=608601). Daily returns cover the pre-event period March 4, 2009
through April 29, 2010 (250 daily returns). Returns data provided by finance.yahoo.com.
143 Damodar N. Gujarati, BAsic ECONOMETRICS 280-81 (1995).
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Table 1. Regressions Results
CMCSA TWC CVC MCCC DTV DISH CATV
ao 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(-0.34) (1.12) (0.51) (-0.76) (0.99) (0.31) (025)
1 1.049 1.099 1.212 1.848 0.736 1.233 ...
(13.36)a (12.50)a (12.5)a (11.77)Y (10.39)a (9.86)a
yl 0.001 -0.013 -0.007 0.012 -0.006 -0.008 0.004
(0.05) (-0.81) (-0.42) (0.42) (-0.47) (-0.34) (0.43)
Y2 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.007 -0.012 -0.004 -0.002
(-0.02) (0.14) (0.45) (0.25) (-0.88) (-0.17) (-0.17)
Y3 -0.030 -0.048 -0.034 -0.047 0.015 0.011 -0.040
(-2.00)' (-2.92)a (-1.88)b (-1.59) (1.14) (0.48) (-3.8)'
Y4 0.008 -0.007 0.007 -0.085 0.037 0.023 -0.019
(0.57) (-0.42) (0.40) (-2.9)' (2.85)a (1.00) (1 .84)b
y1 -0.063 -0.044 -0.077 -0.003 0.010 -0.027 -0.046
(-4.23)a (-2.67)a (-4.2)a (-0.11) (0.75) (-1.13) (-4.4)a
FY= 0 -0.083 -0.108 -0.103 -0.115 0.046 -0.002 -0.102
(X2) (6.31)a (6.38)a (8.55)' (2.99)b (2.30) (0.001) (19.5)b
R2 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.33 0.28 ...
Note: Statistically-significant at the 5% level (a) and 10% level (b).
From Table 1 we see large negative returns for all the cable company stocks
during the event period. Over the event window, the negative abnormal returns
for the cable operators are about 10% on average, and all are statistically sig-
nificant at the 10% level or better." The cumulative abnormal return for Com-
cast is about -8%, but it is -11.5% for Mediacom. Time Warner Cable and Ca-
blevision have negative returns of about 10.5% over the event window. Con-
straining the coefficients on the pulse dummies to be equal across the cable
144 The general findings are unaffected if the equations are estimated as a system (using
Seemingly Unrelated Regression) or if bootstrapping is used for hypothesis testing. See,
e.g., George S. Ford and Audrey D. Kline, Event Studies for Merger Analysis: An Evalua-
tion of the Effects of Non- Normality on Hypothesis Testing, in ANTITRUST POLICY ISSUES,
Ch. 8 (2006); John Jackson, Audrey Kline & Sarah Skinner, The Impact of Non-Normality
and Misspecification on Merger Event Studies, 7 INT'L J. OF THE EcoNoMICS OF BUSINESS
247, 248-264 (2006).
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operators (labeled "CATV" in the final column of Table 1), the estimated cu-
mulative abnormal return is -10.2%, which is statistically different from zero at
better than the 1% level (X2 = 19.47).
The results for DirecTV and Dish Network indicate that the cable operators'
negative returns do not reflect a shock of the video programming market. The
coefficients on the pulse dummies for these companies are not statistically dif-
ferent from zero, save one exception (where the coefficient is positive). Nor are
the cumulative abnormal returns for the firms statistically different from zero
at standard levels. DirecTV had about a 5% positive return over the window,
although this result is only very marginally significant (at the 15% level). Dish
Network's abnormal returns are essentially zero both quantitatively and statis-
tically. This evidence suggests that the large negative abnormal returns for the
broadband providers were a response to reclassification and not a multichannel
video industry shock. In other words, the markets looked at the FCC's State-
ments and sent the stock prices of the relevant firms significantly downward.
This decline suggests that the capital markets accept neither the FCC's prom-
ises nor their characterization of the proposed change in regulation. Since in-
vestment is determined by the capital markets, this is strong evidence that the
reclassification scheme will undermine the allocation of new resources to
broadband infrastructure, even if the FCC ultimately keeps its word.
C. Other Evidence on Credibility and Investment Effects
As our theoretical discussion has demonstrated, the investment effects of re-
classification depend on beliefs about the future actions of the Commission. In
the previous section, we considered formal evidence from the financial markets
regarding investor beliefs about the credibility of light touch regulation. This
evidence indicated that the markets expect heavy-handed regulation in the fu-
ture in response to reclassification and discounted broadband provider stocks
accordingly. As a consequence, investment in broadband networks is expected
to decline (ceteris paribus). The theoretical and empirical analysis above is
also supported by more anecdotal evidence in the form of commentary by in-
dustry and financial analysts.
First, industry analysts plainly expect reclassification to lead to more heavy-
handed regulation. For example, Greg Miller of Collins Stewart, LLC ob-
serves:
Reclassification could act as a Trojan horse for greater regulation: Although the plan
sounds fine on paper, in that the FCC intends to allow all carriers to continue practic-
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ing reasonable network management, the plan would also provide the FCC nearly un-
fettered authority to regulate this segment of the economy, should it decide it is neces-
sary to alter its planned forbearance practice on all other aspects of broadband com-
munications. 145
And, while the Chairman and Mr. Schlick claim price regulation and unbun-
dling are not on the table, few believe this to be true. For example, Craig Mof-
fett, a New York-based analyst with Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., said that "ca-
ble operators" and "Verizon" could be forced to "share . . . network with com-
petitors."'46 Bernstein Research states frankly, "[t]he potential for price regula-
tion speaks to longer term expected growth rates."' 47 Clearly, the investment
community now perceives that "light-touch" regulation lacks credibility.
The implications for capital expenditures in the industry are also understood.
For example, Bank of America/Merrill Lynch states:
Based on our analysis the potential for lower investment are likely and the ramifica-
tions will be felt not just in telecom and cable, but potentially in the vendor sector as
well. We believe the only leverage carriers have beyond the Courts in this debate are
jobs and investment and both could be threatened by this move.14 8
Likewise, Craig Moffett predicts reclassification will have "profoundly nega-
tive impact on investment."' 49 And, Standard and Poor's analyst Tuna Amobi
noted that a "'third-way' framework . . . creates potential long-term negative
investment (and competitive) implications for major cable broadband provid-
ers."' These views on regulation and investment are entirely consistent with
our theoretical and empirical analysis. The fact that the Commission cannot
credibly commit to "light touch" regulation with Title II authority, and the con-
sequent negative effects on investment, are widely accepted.
145 Greg Miller, FCC Moving Closer to Some Title II Regulations? Collins Stewart, LLC
(May 7, 2010).
146 Todd Shields, FCC Begins Reclaiming Authority Over Internet Access Providers,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 6, 2010, 4:50 PM EDT),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-06/fcc-reclaims-powers-over-intemet-access-
companies-update3-.html.
147 Bernstein Research, U.S. Cable: Pulling the Plug ... Regulatory Uncertainty Clouds
Terminal Growth Rates; Downgrading Sector to Neutral (May 10, 2010).
148 Internet Regulation Back on the Front Burner, BANK OF AMERICA/MERRILL LYNCH
(May 5, 2010).
149 Shields, supra note 146.
Iso William Spain, FCC Chief Broaches New Approach on 'Net Neutrality', MARKET-
WATCH (May 6, 2010, 4:39 P.M EDT), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/cable-shares-
hit-by-fcc-move-on-net-neutrality-2010-05-06).
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IV. DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES OF TITLE I ANCILLARY
AUTHORITY
A. Why the FCC Lost in Comcast
Despite some popular misconceptions,'"' broadband was never totally de-
regulated. Rather, broadband was lightly regulated under the FCC's ancillary
Title I jurisdiction, as opposed to heavily regulated under Title II.152 Although
perhaps not the cleanest of legal arguments, the concept and enforceability of
the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction is very real and established by the courts.'53
After all, as the Supreme Court made quite clear in Brand X, the "Commission
remains free to impose special regulatory duties on facilities based [Internet
Service Providers] under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction."'54 The question,
therefore, is why did the FCC lose in Comcast?
Although there is a wide swath of theories as to why the FCC lost in Com-
1' For discussion on the Title II regulation see Sam Gustin, The FCC's 'Third Way' on
Net Neutrality Reignites Broadband Fight, DAILYFINANCE.COM (May 7, 2010, 9:00 AM),
http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/media/fcc-third-way-on-net-neutrality-reignites-
broadband-fight/19467729/. See Ryan Womach, American Broadband Market Works,
Economists Say, BROADBANDBREAKFAST.COm (June 15, 2009, 1:21 PM),
http://broadbandbreakfast.com/2009/06/american-broadband-market-works-economists-
say/. For discussion on misconceptions regard broadband deregulation, see Lawrence Spi-
wak, The FCC's disingenuous 'third way' on broadband, CNET NEWS (May 19, 2010,
12:32 PM PDT), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-20005416-94.html.
152 See, e.g., Petition for Declaratory Ruling that pulver.com's Free World Dialup is
Neither Telecommunications Nor a Telecommunications Service, WC Docket No. 03-45,
Memorandum Opinion, 19 F.C.C.R. 3307 (2004); Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access
to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities; Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling;
Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facili-
ties, GN Docket No. 00-185, CS Docket No. 02-52, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4832, 59 (2002) (Cable Modem Reclassification
Order), aff'd, NCTA v. BrandX, 545 U.S. 967 (2005); Framework for Broadband Access to
the Internet over Wireline Facilities; Universal Service Obligations of Broadband Providers,
CC Docket Nos. 02-33, 01-337, 95-20, 98-10, WC Docket Nos. 04-242, 05-271, Report and
Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 14864, 14909-11, 15, T
103-04 (2005) (Wireline Broadband Reclassification Order), aff'd sub nom. Time Warner
Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3rd Cir. 2007); Wireless Broadband Classification
Order, supra note 47; United Power Line Council's Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regard-
ing the Classification of Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Service as an Informa-
tion Service, WC Docket No. 06-10, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13281,
13288, 11 (2006) (BPL Reclassification Order).
'5 See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968); United
States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 F.3d 689, 691 (1972) [hereinafter Midwest Video f].
'54 BrandX, 545 U.S. at 998.
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cast, perhaps the most straightforward explanation is that the Commission
simply wrote a bad order. According to the court, in order to prove ancillary
authority, the Commission must satisfy a two-part test distilled in American
Library Association v. FCC."' First, the Commission must show that the regu-
lated subject under consideration falls under the Commission's general juris-
dictional grant under Title I of the Communications Act; and second, that the
"regulations are reasonably ancillary to the Commission's effective perform-
ance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities.""' As agreed in the Comcast
case, broadband networks fell under the Commission's broad Title I authority
because the Internet service qualifies as "interstate and foreign communica-
tions by wire"; the primary issue before the court was whether the Commission
had made a compelling argument that it satisfied the second prong of the
American Library test, which is to tie the proposed regulation to the Commis-
sion's express statutory objectives under Title 1I, IlI, or VI of the Act."'
The Commission never did. Rather, the Commission attempted to hook its
ancillary authority to (among other sections) Section 230(b), which provides
that "[i]t is the policy of the United States . . . to promote the continued devel-
opment of the Internet and other interactive computer services" and "to en-
courage the development of technologies which maximize user control over
what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the
Internet.""' Similarly, the Commission cited to the language of Section 1,
which provides that the purpose of the Communications Act is to "regulat[e]
interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to
make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States . . . a
rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication
service . . . at reasonable charges . . . .""9 The court rejected both arguments,
finding that "policy statements alone cannot provide the basis for the Commis-
sion's exercise of ancillary authority."'" According to the court, this rule
derives from the "axiomatic" principle that "administrative agencies may [act]
only pursuant to authority delegated to them by Congress." Policy statements
are just that-statements of policy. They are not delegations of regulatory au-
thority. 161
1s American Library Ass'n. v. FCC,406 F.3d 689, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
56 Id. at 691-92.
15 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 646-47.
Si Id. at 651; Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006).
19' Comcast, 600 F.3d at 646-647; 47 U.S.C. § 152(a).
160 See Comcast, 600 F.3d at 651-652,654 (referencing 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)
161 Id. at 654. By the same logic, the court also rejected the FCC's citation to Section
706's statement that the Commission "shall encourage" the deployment of advanced tele-
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The next area of concern was statutory provisions where the court found that
the Commission could have at least made plausible arguments, but for both
"substantive and procedural" reasons failed to do so.'62 For example, the Com-
mission cited to Section 256, which directs the Commission to "establish pro-
cedures for . .. oversight of coordinated network planning . . . for the effective
and efficient interconnection of public telecommunications networks."' 3 How-
ever, the court chided the agency for neglecting to mention the same statute
goes on to read that that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed as ex-
panding ... any authority that the Commission" otherwise has under law. . . ."
which, in the court's view, was precisely what the Commission was trying to
do in the Comcast case. 1
The court next tackled the Commission's use of Section 257. Under Section
257, the Commission is supposed to both complete a proceeding (long-since
accomplished) "identifying and eliminating, by regulations pursuant to its au-
thority under this chapter (other than this section), market entry barriers for
entrepreneurs and other small businesses in the provision and ownership of
telecommunications services and information services" and then issue a fol-
low-up report every three years on remaining barriers. 6 ' The court's response
was quite interesting. According to the court,
We readily accept that certain assertions of Commission authority could be "reasona-
bly ancillary" to the Commission's statutory responsibility to issue a report to Con-
gress. For example, the Commission might impose disclosure requirements on regu-
lated entities in order to gather data needed for such a report. But the Commission's
attempt to dictate the operation of an otherwise unregulated service based on nothing
more than its obligation to issue a report defies any plausible notion of "ancillari-
ness."'
66
The court also rejected the Commission's attempt to link its ancillary jurisdic-
tion to its limited authority to regulate cable rates under Section 623. Accord-
ing to the court, the Commission's Section 623 argument fails "because, unlike
its Title II authority over common carrier rates, its section 623 authority is
sharply limited."6 6 The court explained that not only does Section 623 prohibit
"the Commission from regulating rates for 'video programming offered on a . .
communications services. According to the court, "the Commission is seeking to use its
ancillary authority to pursue a stand-alone policy objective, rather than to support its exer-
cise of a specifically delegated power." Id. at 658-659.
162 Id. at 644.
163 See Id. at 659 (referencing 47 U.S.C. § 256(b)(1)).
'6 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 659.
165 47 U.S.C. § 257(a) (2006).
166 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 659-660 (citing to Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. v. FCC, 309
F.3d 796, 801-802 (D.C. Cir. 2002)(Emphasis added).
167 Id. at 661.
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. per program basis,' i.e., video-on-demand service", but its "current authority
is limited to setting standards for and overseeing local regulation of rates for
'basic tier' service on certain cable systems."'" However, the court found that
the FCC did not even assert ancillary authority based on this narrow grant of
regulatory power; instead, the court chided the Commission for arguing that
"Section 1 gives the Commission ancillary authority to ensure reasonable rates
for all communication services, including those, like video-on-demand, over
which it has no express regulatory authority." 69
That said, the court sent clear signals on how the Commission could have
written a better order. For example, the court appeared to be sympathetic to the
Commission's argument in the Comcast Order, which stated that "by blocking
certain traffic on Comcast's Internet service, the company had effectively
shifted the burden of that traffic to other service providers, some of which were
operating their Internet access services on a common carrier basis subject to
Title II."'70 Moreover, "by marginally increasing the variable costs of those
providers, the Commission maintained, Comcast's blocking of peer-to-peer
transmissions affected common carrier rates" under Section 201."' This ap-
proach adheres to the basic template of ancillary authority, where the regula-
tion is tied to obligations found in Title II. However, because the Commission
failed to make this argument on appeal, the court held that it was precluded
from considering it.172
Conversely, the Commission argued that "Voice over Internet Protocol
(VoIP) services . . . affect the prices and practices of traditional telephony
common carriers subject to Section 201 regulation."' 73 The Commission noted
that "some VoIP services were disrupted by Comcast's network management
practices."'74 However, the court rejected this argument on appeal because it
was not originally advanced in the Comcast Order.' Again, a straightforward
application of ancillary authority that ties the regulations to a direct statutory
mandate.
The court found also that "the same problem undercuts the Commission's
effort to link its regulation of Comcast's network management practices to its
168 Id.
169 Id
170 See id. at 660 (referencing the Comcast Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 13,037-38 at 17).
'71 Id.
172 Id. at 660.
in Comcast, 600 F.3d at 660.
174 Id. at 660-661.
' Id.
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Title III authority over broadcasting.""' On appeal, the Commission contended
that "Internet video 'has the potential to affect the broadcast industry' by influ-
encing 'local origination of programming, diversity of viewpoints, and the de-
sirability of providing service in certain markets.""" Yet, as before, the court
noted that "the Commission cited no source for this argument in the [Comcast]
Order", and therefore the court found that the Commission's argument was
precluded on appeal."'
B. Writing a Better Order
The Comcast court makes it abundantly clear that if the FCC wants to create
a legally enforceable Title I regime to protect consumers, it is certainly within
its powers to do so. The FCC simply needs to make a sound argument about
what it wants to do and tie such actions to a clearly ancillary authority under
the Act."' Below, we consider two primary areas of the debate: transparency
and blocking of traffic.
1. Transparency
There is wide consensus that transparency will make a giant contribution
towards ensuring what many refer to (vaguely) as an "Open Internet."'o In
fact, transparency-and not a bright-line non-discrimination rule-is precisely
how the European Union handled this very issue.'"' Fortunately, much of the
intellectual "heavy lifting" to develop an ancillary jurisdiction paradigm for
transparency has already been done by the Commission itself.' 2
176 Id
17 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 660.
178 Id. at 660.
17 Id at 646.
180 See Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Preserving a Free and
Open Internet: A Platform for Innovation, Opportunity, and Prosperity, Prepared Remarks at
The Brookings Institute (Sept. 21, 2009); see also In re Preserving the Open Internet Broad-
band Industry Practices, Reply Comments of the Open Internet Coalition, GN Docket No.
09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Apr. 26, 2010).
181 See, e.g., Lawrence J. Spiwak, Bright Lines, Big Problems, FORBES.COM (Jan. 12,
2010, 2:00 PM EST), http://www.forbes.com/2010/01/12/networl-neutrality-european-
union-fcc-opinions-contributors-lawrence-j-spiwak.html). See also Council Directive
2009/136, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 32 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:337:0011:0036:EN:PDF).
182 See Wireline Broadband Reclassification Order, supra note 152, 108.
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As the Commission has already recognized, and courts have affirmed,'83
"the predicates for ancillary jurisdiction are likely satisfied for any consumer
protection, network reliability, or national security obligation that we may sub-
sequently decide to impose on wireline broadband Internet access service pro-
viders."' 84 While this statement was made under the Martin Commission, the
Genachowski Commission continues to share this view.'"' Indeed, in 2009's
"Truth-in-Billing" Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the agency appeared to set
forth a sound rationale on how it could extend its Title I ancillary authority to
broadband service providers.'"'
In particular, the Commission set forth two reasons why "both of the predi-
cates for ancillary jurisdiction are likely to be satisfied for consumer protection
obligations that it may decide to impose on non-Title II services such as broad-
band Internet access and subscription video services.""' First, the Commission
noted that it has "subject matter jurisdiction over the providers of these ser-
vices.""' In the Commission's view, these services "clearly constitute either
'wire communication' as defined in Section 3(52), when they take the form of
signals transmitted by wire or cable, or 'radio communication' as defined in
Section 3(33), and when they take the form of signals transmitted by radio."'
Moreover, the Commission argued that "Section 2(a) of the Act gives the
Commission subject matter jurisdiction over 'all interstate and foreign com-
munications by wire or radio .. . and ... all persons engaged within the United
States in such communication."""8 Second, the Commission argued that
consumer protection regulation of at least some of these services would be similar to
the regulation that [it] found in the Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Or-
der to be 'reasonably ancillary' to the Commission's responsibility to implement Sec-
tion 222 (customer privacy), 255 (disability access), and 258 (slamming and truth-in-
billing), among other provisions of the Act.' 9'
While one never knows how this exact argument will be viewed by a review-
183 Id. 340.
184 Id. 109.
18 See In re Consumer Information and Disclosure, Truth-in-Billing and Billing Format,
IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Inquiry, CG Docket No. 09-158, CC Docket No. 98-170,
WC Docket No. 04-3624 F.C.C.R. 11380, 11399, 61 (Aug. 27, 2009).
186 Id
187 Id. 62.
188 Id. 63.
189 Id
190 Id. 63; see 47 U.S.C. § 152(a).
191 See In re Consumer Information and Disclosure, Truth-in-Billing and Billing Format,
IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Inquiry, CG Docket No. 09-158, CC Docket No. 98-170,
WC Docket No. 04-3624 F.C.C.R. 11380, 11399, % 62 -63 (Aug. 27, 2009).
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ing court, the Commission at least appears to address all of the legal pitfalls
highlighted by the Comcast court.
2. Blocking of Traffic
At bottom, perhaps the central fear behind the "Open Internet" debate is the
concern that a BSP will somehow block or degrade a competitor's product in
favor of its own traffic. The Commission attempted to address this issue in the
Open Internet NPRM by using a tortured interpretation of the interconnection
provisions contained in Section 251 as a mechanism to impose price regula-
tion.'92 As demonstrated above, however, not only does the Commission's pro-
posed pricing rule violate the existing jurisprudence behind Section 202, but it
also violates the Commission's own precedent when originally implementing
Section 251 in 1996.
More importantly, previous research has clearly demonstrated that the
Commission's pricing regulation has it "backwards" in that the proposed rules
would actually encourage-not deter-exclusionary behavior.'" By foreclos-
ing the use of prices to acquire surplus, the firms are incentivized to use alter-
native and less desirable means such as sabotage, foreclosure, or vertical mer-
ger.'94 Regulation induces such actions, not simply profit maximization.' Giv-
en these numerous analytical flaws, accepting the FCC's Open Internet NPRM
as currently adopted is simply bad public policy.
Rather than inappropriately using Section 251 as a pricing statute,'96 the
Commission should correctly use the interconnection and access provisions
contained in Section 251 ' as an analytical anchor for ancillary authority. This
approach would prevent firms from engaging in some sort of strategic anti-
competitive conduct by blocking or degrading lawful IP traffic. In other words,
192 In re Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, FCC 90-93, CG Docket No. 09-19 1, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Oct. 22, 2009).
'9 George Ford and Michael Stern, Sabotaging Content Competition: Do Proposed Net
Neutrality Regulations Promote Exclusion?, 16 PHOENIX CENTER PERSPECTIVE No. 10-02
(2010), available at http://www.phoenix-center.org/perspectives/Perspective 1 0-02Final.pdf.
194 Id. at n. 28.
195 Id. at 5.
196 FORD & SPIWAK, supra note 47.
197 Under Section 251(a)(1), each "telecommunications carrier has the duty - to inter-
connect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications
carriers." Moreover, under Section 251(c)(2), incumbent local exchange carriers must pro-
vide such interconnection "at any technically feasible point"; be "at least equal in quality to
that provided by the local exchange carrier to itself or to . . . any other party"; and on "rates,
terms and conditions that are just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory ... ."
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"practices" regulation, not price regulation.
This approach is not a revolutionary idea. For example, University of Penn-
sylvania Professor Kevin Werbach argues that the FCC could define two new
subset categories of information service providers subject to its ancillary juris-
diction.'" Professor Werbach's first subset is those information services "so
identical to telecommunications services as to make the distinction purely an
invitation for arbitrage."'" By way of example, Professor Werbach points to
the Commission's rejection of AT&T's petition for declaratory ruling that us-
ing "VolP in the middle" of its backbone warranted regulatory reclassifica-
tion.200 Werbach's second subset would be "broadband access platforms"-i.e.,
those "hybrid services" that "integrate telecommunications and information
services in order to provide end users with access to the Internet."2"' Under
such a definition, argues Professor Werbach, a clear case of ancillarity can be
made because
broadband-Internet services and content threaten FCC statutory obligations in two
ways: (1) unregulated services can mimic and compete with regulated telecommunica-
tions services, and (2) simultaneously, those regulated services can either escape from
regulation or harm competitions higher up [the production chain].202
Thus, concludes Werbach, this "narrow approach would avoid the need to
impose the full panoply of common-carrier obligations or cable-TV rules on
broadband-access providers. "203
Moreover, there is precedent for using Section 251 to make sure IP traffic is
198 Kevin D. Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 535, 571, 576-81 (2010). We
also note that Professor Werbach attempted to tie ancillary jurisdiction to Section 256.
However, as noted supra, the Comcast court rejected that argument out of hand, so we need
not address it here.
199 Id. at 577.
200 Id See also In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling that AT&T's Phone-to-Phone IP
Telephony Services Are Exempt from Access Charges, Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 7457 TT 12-13
(Apr. 14, 2004).
201 Werbach, supra note 198, at 578.
202 Id. Under the same logic, an ancillary authority argument could be extended to
broadband service (or even transport) directly. Prior court decisions make it relatively clear
that ancillary authority can be legitimized in any case where the service or practice of inter-
est has demand or cost interdependencies with a Title 11, Title Ill, or Title VI service. See,
e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co. and Midwest Video I supra note 153. Clearly,
the increased adoption of broadband services has had significant impacts on the purchase of
more traditional voice and video services, and the apparent demand and cost effects of such
interdependencies lead directly to a sound argument for ancillary authority.
203 Werbach, supra note 198 at 578 (emphasis added). See also Schlick Statement, supra
note 5, at 2-3 ("[T]he FCC would be on safe legal ground only to the extent its actions re-
garding emerging broadband services were intended to affect traditional services like tele-
phone and television.").
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terminated. For example, the FCC's Wireline Competition Bureau took a simi-
lar approach in 2007 when two rural exchange carriers, both backed by their
respective local Public Utilities Commissions, refused to terminate third-party
VolP traffic.204 RLECs argue they had no obligation to participate in intercon-
nection agreements with competitive local exchange providers (CLECs) in
instances where the CLECs operated wholesale services on behalf of VoIP
providers.205 In the particular case of the South Carolina dispute, the South
Carolina Commission held that the CLEC was not entitled to seek interconnec-
tion with the rural incumbent LEC. The South Carolina Commission deter-
mined that the CLEC's wholesale service did not fall within the meaning of a
"telecommunications service" under the Act.206 In the case of the Nebraska
dispute, the Nebraska Commission found that the CLEC was not a "telecom-
munications carrier." There, the Nebraska Commission determined that the
relationship between the CLEC and VoIP provider is an "individually negoti-
ated and tailored, private business agreement" that is an untarrifed offering
and, therefore, does not fit under the purview of Section 251 .207 Significantly,
the Bureau disagreed with both.20 8 According to the Bureau, the "statutory clas-
sification of a third party provider's VoIP service as an information service or
a telecommunications service is irrelevant to the issue of whether a wholesale
provider of telecommunications may seek interconnection under Section
251(a)."209 Stated another way, Section 251 commands that all BSPs must ter-
minate and transport all IP traffic, regardless of the source.
Not surprisingly, the current Commission agrees. As the Commission noted
in the National Broadband Plan, the Commission "should clarify interconnec-
tion rights and obligations and encourage the shift to IP-to-IP interconnection
where efficient. "210 Why? Because in the Commission's view, "[f]or competi-
tion to thrive, the principle of interconnection-in which customers of one ser-
vice provider can communicate with customers of another-needs to be main-
tained." 21' Thus, according to the Commission:
204 In re Time Warner Cable Request for Declaratory Ruing that Competitive Local Ex-
change Carriers May Obtain Interconnection Under Section 251 of the Communications Act
of 1934, as Amended, to Provide Wholesale Telecommunications Services to VoIP Provid-
ers, Memorandum and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 3513, 8-16 (March 1, 2007).
205 Id. 3.
206 Id. 5.
207 Id. 6.
20s Id. J 2-3 (2010).
209 Id. 15.
210 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 14, at 49.
211 Id.
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To prevent the spread of this anticompetitive interpretation of the Act and eliminate a
barrier to broadband deployment, the FCC should clarify rights and obligations re-
garding interconnection to remove any regulatory uncertainty. In particular, the FCC
should confirm that all telecommunications carriers, including rural carriers, have a
duty to interconnect their networks. The FCC should also determine what actions it
could take to encourage transitions to IP-to-IP interconnection where that is the most
efficient approach.212
Given these parameters, developing a legally sustainable access paradigm to
protect the "Open Internet" should not be that difficult. The Commission could
set up some sort of "rocket docket" to adjudicate access claims. The Commis-
sion used such a procedural mechanism quite effectively to enforce the original
implementation of Section 251, and there is no reason why such a mechanism
could not be reconstituted.2 3 Second, the Commission could focus on a case-
specific inquiry as to whether or not the BSP engaged in some sort of strategic
anticompetitive conduct, rather than attempt to regulate the reasonableness of
the BSP's day-to-day network management practices. In such cases, we expect
there would be some showing of measurable harm.214
2 12 Id.
213 The Commission introduced an Accelerated Docket for formal complaints to effectu-
ate a "prompt resolution of all complaints in order to 'reduce impediments to robust compe-
tition in all telecommunications markets."' In re Implementation of The Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, Amendment of Rules Governing Procedures to Be Followed When For-
mal Complaints are Filed Against Common Carriers, Second Report & Order, 13 F.C.C.R.
17,018, 1-5, 16-21 (July 9, 1998).
214 In conflict with the common view, profit maximizing broadband providers have too
little incentive-relative to the social welfare maximizing level-to remedy congestion
problems. Consequently, any action aimed to reduce congestion should be presumed lawful
and the burden of proof should rest on those contesting the congestion-reducing activity. See
George S. Ford, Thomas M. Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, The Welfare Impacts of
Broadband Network Management: Can Broadband Service Providers be Trusted?, 6, 8-9,
11-12, 14, 15-17, 19 (2008), available at http://www.phoenix-
center.org/pcpp/PCPP32Final.pdf See also Gregory L. Rosston & Michael D. Topper, An
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V. CONCLUSION
In light of the D.C. Circuit's recent ruling in Comcast v. FCC,215 Federal
Communications Commission Chairman Julius Genachowski announced that
he would seek to reclassify broadband transport as a "telecommunications ser-
vice" under Title II of the Communications Act.216 While providing greater
regulatory certainty, this certainty is beneficial solely to the Commission. As
the Commission itself concedes, reclassification, increases the regulator's abil-
ity to impose ill-suited regulations on broadband.217 In fact, Chairman Gena-
chowski recognizes that reclassification "can chill investment and innovation"
by reducing "investors confidence." 218 In an effort to temper the negative ef-
fects on investment from such expanded regulation, the Chairman proposed a
"Third Way," in which reclassification occurs but the agency "[puts] in place
up-front forbearance and meaningful boundaries to guard against regulatory
overreach."219 Put simply, the Chairman is seeking the unhindered authority to
impose heavy-handed regulation, but promises not to do so.
This "Third Way" approach to Title 1I regulation boils down to credibility:
can the Commission be trusted to self-impose regulatory moderation? The evi-
dence does not support the Chairman's claim of a "light touch." First, reclassi-
fication itself is a reversal of broadband policies in place for nearly a decade.
Second, the agency is considering or has recently implemented expanded regu-
lation in many sectors of the communications industry, including the prices of
broadband transport and pricing and practices in the wireless sector. Third,
while the Commission may have convinced itself that it has such discipline, it
recognizes that it cannot pre-commit to long-term moderation. Market partici-
pants also recognize and responded to the lack of pre-commitment. Empirical
evidence indicates that the investment community does not regard as credible
the Chairman's "light touch" promises. Based on a theoretical model of in-
vestment and the empirical evidence, a reduction in investment in broadband
infrastructure is expected following reclassification.
Finally, we show that the Comcast decision is not a threat to ancillary au-
thority for broadband; the Commission merely has to make better arguments.
Indeed, opening the door to heavy-handed regulation that will reduce invest-
ment and harm consumer welfare based upon a fear of protracted litigation is
215 ComCast, 600 F.3d at 642.
216 Genachowski Statement, supra note 3, at 5.
217 Id
218 Id.
219 Id.
2010] 121
122 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS [Vol. 19
no way to make public policy. Although the Chairman's "Third Way" may
provide the Commission with a perceived blanket of legal comfort, that legal
certainty comes at the expense of financial uncertainty. The Comcast court
makes clear that Title I continues to provide sound legal footing to protect con-
sumers from harm-at least until Congress decides to update and amend exist-
ing Communications law with a cleaner framework.
